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A SKEPTICAL VIEW OF INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES 
Lina M. Khan∗ & David E. Pozen∗∗ 
The concept of “information fiduciaries” has surged to the forefront of debates on online-
platform regulation.  Developed by Professor Jack Balkin, the concept is meant to rebalance 
the relationship between ordinary individuals and the digital companies that accumulate, 
analyze, and sell their personal data for profit.  Just as the law imposes special duties of care, 
confidentiality, and loyalty on doctors, lawyers, and accountants vis-à-vis their patients and 
clients, Balkin argues, so too should it impose special duties on corporations such as 
Facebook, Google, and Twitter vis-à-vis their end users.  Over the past several years, this 
argument has garnered remarkably broad support and essentially zero critical pushback. 
This Article seeks to disrupt the emerging consensus by identifying a number of lurking 
tensions and ambiguities in the theory of information fiduciaries, as well as a number of 
reasons to doubt the theory’s capacity to resolve them satisfactorily.  Although we agree with 
Balkin that the harms stemming from dominant online platforms call for legal intervention, 
we question whether the concept of information fiduciaries is an adequate or apt response 
to the problems of information insecurity that he stresses, much less to more fundamental 
problems associated with outsized market share and business models built on pervasive 
surveillance.  We also call attention to the potential costs of adopting an information-
fiduciary framework — a framework that, we fear, invites an enervating complacency toward 
online platforms’ structural power and a premature abandonment of more robust visions of 
public regulation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Digital businesses such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter collect an 
enormous amount of data about their users.  Sometimes they do things 
with this data that threaten the users’ best interests, from allowing pred-
atory advertising and enabling discrimination to inducing addiction and 
sharing sensitive details with third parties.  Online platforms may also 
disserve their users and the general public in myriad other ways, includ-
ing by facilitating the spread of disinformation and the harassment of 
certain categories of speakers.  The European Union has responded to 
some of these concerns with a comprehensive personal data law, the 
General Data Protection Regulation1 (GDPR).  After years of relative 
neglect, U.S. policymakers, roused by Russian interference in the 2016 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School. 
 ∗∗ Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  For helpful comments and conversations, we thank 
Alex Abdo, Jack Balkin, Danielle Citron, Evan Criddle, Kristen Eichensehr, Andrew Gold, James 
Grimmelmann, Claudia Haupt, Thomas Kadri, Amy Kapczynski, Ramya Krishnan, Ronald  
Krotoszynski, Genevieve Lakier, Kyle Langvardt, Ethan Leib, Barry Lynn, Tamara Piety, Robert 
Post, Jed Purdy, Neil Richards, Marc Rotenberg, Chuck Sabel, Ganesh Sitaraman, Matt Stoller, 
Tim Wu, and Jonathan Zittrain, as well as workshop participants at Cornell Tech, University of 
Denver Sturm College of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, and Yale Law School. 
 1 Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.  The GDPR, which was adopted in 2016 
and entered into force in May 2018, id. at 87, replaced a 1995 directive on data protection, Council 
Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31. 
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presidential election and the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica scandal, 
have begun to consider a range of reforms to enhance consumer privacy, 
corporate transparency, and data security on the internet.2  To an un-
precedented degree, technology firms in general and online platforms in 
particular find themselves “in Congress’s sights.”3 
Among the reforms under consideration is the idea of treating online 
platforms as “information fiduciaries.”  Professor Kenneth Laudon ap-
pears to have coined this phrase in the early 1990s.4  Since 2014, it has 
been identified with Professor Jack Balkin, who has developed the idea 
over a series of papers.5  Ordinary people, Balkin observes, are deeply 
dependent on and vulnerable to the digital companies that accumulate, 
analyze, and sell their personal data for profit.  To mitigate this vulner-
ability and ensure these companies do not betray the trust people place 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 2 See, e.g., MARK R. WARNER, POTENTIAL POLICY PROPOSALS FOR REGULATION OF 
SOCIAL MEDIA AND TECHNOLOGY FIRMS 5–23 (2018), https://graphics.axios.com/pdf/Platform 
PolicyPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VCL-TSHM] (surveying policy options).  
 3 HEATHER WHITNEY, EMERGING THREATS: SEARCH ENGINES, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND 
THE EDITORIAL ANALOGY 2 (David Pozen ed., 2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/kfai-documents/ 
documents/4959005632/Search-Engines--Social-Media--and-the-Editorial-Analogy.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/2RT4-A9HE].  
 4 See Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, ICIS 1993 PROC. 65, 70–71 (proposing a “Na-
tional Information Market,” id. at 70, within which “information fiduciaries would naturally arise” 
and “would accept deposits of information from depositors and seek to maximize the return on sales 
of that information in national markets or elsewhere in return for a fee,” id. at 71).  
 5 Balkin first promoted the idea in a 2014 blog post.  Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries 
in the Digital Age, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 5, 2014, 4:50 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/ 
03/information-fiduciaries-in-digital-age.html [https://perma.cc/L277-CZLG] [hereinafter Balkin, 
Digital Age].  He most fully elaborated his views in Jack M. Balkin, Lecture, Information Fiduci-
aries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016) [hereinafter Balkin, Information 
Fiduciaries].  Additional discussions include Jack M. Balkin, Essay, Free Speech in the Algorithmic 
Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1149, 1160–63 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin, Algorithmic Society]; Jack M. Balkin, Essay, Free Speech 
Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2047–54 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin, Triangle]; Jack M. 
Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information- 
fiduciary/502346 [https://perma.cc/3PL4-3SQT]; and Jack M. Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand 
Bargain 11–15 (Hoover Working Grp. on Nat’l Sec., Tech. & Law, Aegis Series Paper No. 1814, 
2018), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/balkin_webreadypdf.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/774R-AD7D] [hereinafter Balkin, Fixing Social Media].  Professor Jonathan Zittrain has also 
been an important theorist and advocate of the information-fiduciary concept.  See, e.g., Balkin & 
Zittrain, supra; Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone Ever Finding 
Out, NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117878/information-fiduciary- 
solution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/K2EE-8YJ5]; Jonathan Zittrain, How 
to Exercise the Power You Didn’t Ask For, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 19, 2018), https:// 
hbr.org/2018/09/how-to-exercise-the-power-you-didnt-ask-for [https://perma.cc/W233-C7Q6] [here-
inafter Zittrain, How to Exercise]; Jonathan Zittrain, Opinion, Mark Zuckerberg Can Still Fix This 
Mess, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2EsJ0La [https://perma.cc/LMA7-EVKE] [herein-
after Zittrain, Fix This Mess]. 
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in them,6 Balkin urges that we draw on principles of fiduciary obliga-
tion.  Just as the law imposes special duties of care, confidentiality, and 
loyalty on doctors, lawyers, accountants, and estate managers vis-à- 
vis their patients and clients, so too should it impose such duties on 
Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter, and Uber vis-à-vis their end us-
ers — although Balkin concedes that the duties would be “more limited” 
in the digital context.7 
Support for this idea is swelling.  Dozens of legal scholars have en-
dorsed Balkin’s proposal or discussed it approvingly.8  Journalists have 
covered it with undisguised enthusiasm; a recent Bloomberg subheadline 
reads: “America needs data rules that won’t crush the tech industry.  
One law professor may have figured out a solution.”9  Lawmakers from 
both parties have expressed interest.10  Last December, a group of fifteen 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 In recent years, a number of privacy law scholars have highlighted ways in which privacy 
and trust are intertwined online, if not co-constitutive.  See, e.g., ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY 
AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE (2018); Neil Richards & 
Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016). 
 7 Jack M. Balkin, Lecture, 2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and 
Policy: The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1229 (2017) 
[hereinafter Balkin, Three Laws of Robotics]; Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1226; 
Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 12. 
 8 On our reading, the academic literature taking up the idea of information fiduciaries has been 
overwhelmingly supportive.  For representative responses from leading scholars of internet law, see 
Frank Pasquale, Lecture, Response: Toward a Fourth Law of Robotics: Preserving Attribution, Re-
sponsibility, and Explainability in an Algorithmic Society, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1243, 1244 (2017) (“I 
believe that Balkin’s concept of information fiduciary is well developed and hard to challenge.”); 
and Tim Wu, Opinion, An American Alternative to Europe’s Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 
2018), https://nyti.ms/2LIrMy4 [https://perma.cc/8FHR-CMTG] (“[Technology] companies should 
be considered, to borrow a term coined by the law professor Jack Balkin, ‘information fiduciar-
ies’ . . . .”).  The closest we have found to a skeptical note is Professor Jane Bambauer’s suggestion 
that an “expansion of Balkin’s proposal” to cover additional classes of data collectors, such as  
Netflix and Amazon, “could cause unsettling distortions of free speech protection.”  Jane R.  
Bambauer, Response, The Relationships Between Speech and Conduct, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1941, 1949 (2016) (emphasis added).  As far as we are aware, this Article is the first to apply any 
sustained critical scrutiny to the information-fiduciary concept. 
 9 Editorial, How to Make Facebook and Google Behave, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 24, 2018, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-04-24/make-facebook-and-google-information- 
fiduciaries [https://perma.cc/5SFX-FK25] [hereinafter Bloomberg Editorial].  On a single day this 
past spring, Balkin’s proposal received glowing coverage in multiple popular pieces.  See Russell 
Brandom, This Plan Would Regulate Facebook Without Going Through Congress, THE VERGE (Apr. 
12, 2018, 11:32 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/12/17229258/facebook-regulation-fiduciary- 
rule-data-proposal-balkin [https://perma.cc/WHW7-G3AP]; Yves Faguy, Regulating Facebook to 
Make It an Information Fiduciary, NAT’L MAG. (Apr. 12, 2018), https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20180416050935/http://www.nationalmagazine.ca/Articles/April-2018/Regulating-Facebook-to-
make-it-an-information-fidu.aspx [https://perma.cc/WS8N-XTBF]; Nathan Heller, We May Own 
Our Data, but Facebook Has a Duty to Protect It, NEW YORKER (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www. 
newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/we-may-own-our-data-but-facebook-has-a-duty-to- 
protect-it [https://perma.cc/KN75-RSZ5]. 
 10 See, e.g., 164 CONG. REC. S2026 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2018) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn) 
(“Perhaps we should treat social media platforms as information fiduciaries and impose legal obli-
gations on them, as we do with lawyers and doctors, who are privy to some of our most personal, 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3341661 
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Democratic senators took the next step and introduced legislation that 
would require online service providers to act as fiduciaries for their us-
ers, drawing directly from Balkin’s proposal.11  Facebook CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg has now signaled his support as well.12  Balkin is the legal 
academy’s preeminent diagnostician of how theories can move over time 
from the margins to the mainstream, from “off-the-wall” to “on-the-
wall.”13  He is also an ingenious idea entrepreneur whose own theory of 
information fiduciaries is rapidly making this very transition. 
We admire Balkin’s ingenuity and applaud his efforts to advance the 
cause of platform regulation.  Yet while we largely agree with his anal-
ysis of why certain digital firms should be regulated more vigorously, 
we question whether the concept of information fiduciaries is an ade-
quate or apt response to the problems of information asymmetry and 
abuse that he stresses, much less to more fundamental problems associ-
ated with market dominance and with business models that demand 
pervasive surveillance.  The primary aims of this Article are, first, to 
identify a number of lurking ambiguities and tensions in the theory of 
information fiduciaries and, second, to raise concerns about the theory’s 
capacity to resolve them satisfactorily.14  The Article also calls attention 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
private information.”); WARNER, supra note 2, at 14–15 (listing Balkin’s idea first on a list of policy 
options for Congress to consider in the area of “Privacy and Data Protection,” id. at 14); Heller, 
supra note 9 (observing that, “[t]o a striking degree, the fiduciary model was the one toward which 
discussion . . . converged” in an April 2018 Senate hearing on Facebook); see also Zittrain, How to 
Exercise, supra note 5 (“We’ve found that our [information-fiduciary] proposal has bipartisan ap-
peal in Congress . . . .”).  
 11 Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018); see also Press Release, Office of Senator 
Brian Schatz, Schatz Leads Group of 15 Senators in Introducing New Bill to Help Protect People’s 
Personal Data Online (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.schatz.senate.gov/press-releases/schatz-leads-
group-of-15-senators-in-introducing-new-bill-to-help-protect-peoples-personal-data-online [https:// 
perma.cc/4PPN-WJL7] (describing the proposed legislation, referred to as the “Data Fiduciary Act” 
by Senator Cory Booker, as “establishing a fiduciary duty for online providers”).  
 12 When Senator Brian Schatz, a lead sponsor of the Data Care Act, raised Balkin’s information-
fiduciary idea at a high-profile hearing last year, “Zuckerberg seemed to perk up.  ‘I think it’s 
certainly an interesting idea,’ Zuckerberg said, ‘and Jack is very thoughtful in this space, so I do 
think it deserves consideration.’”  Brandom, supra note 9.  At a more recent event with Zittrain, 
Zuckerberg described the “idea of [Facebook] having a fiduciary relationship with the people who 
use our services” as “intuitive” and consistent with Facebook’s “own self-image . . . and what we’re 
doing.”  At Harvard Law, Zittrain and Zuckerberg Discuss Encryption, “Information Fiduciaries” 
and Targeted Advertisements, HARV. L. TODAY (Feb. 20, 2019), https://today.law.harvard.edu/at-
harvard-law-zittrain-and-zuckerberg-discuss-encryption-information-fiduciaries-and-targeted- 
advertisements [https://perma.cc/5JNH-T8DQ] [hereinafter Zittrain and Zuckerberg]. 
 13 JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 12 (2011); see id. at 61, 69–70, 88, 119, 
177–83; Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went 
Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/ 
2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040 
[https://perma.cc/Y4LD-8RR5]. 
 14 Given that the firms Balkin would designate as information fiduciaries vary in the services 
they provide, the business models they use, and the market dominance they enjoy, any analysis of 
the designation’s appropriateness or helpfulness will necessarily vary to some extent by firm.  For 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3341661 
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to the potential costs of adopting an information-fiduciary frame-
work — a framework that, we fear, invites an enervating complacency 
about issues of structural power and a premature abandonment of more 
robust visions of public regulation. 
I.  FIDUCIARIES FOR WHOM? 
Balkin offers his theory of information fiduciaries as a response to 
problems of asymmetric vulnerability and dependency online.  A key 
feature of the digital economy, he observed in his original essay on the 
subject, is that “[m]any of the online services that people use require 
them to trust companies with sensitive personal information.”15  These 
companies have “increasing capacities for surveillance and control” of 
their users, but users have little ability to monitor the companies.16  Us-
ers therefore worry, with good reason, that the companies will take ad-
vantage of them.  To help level the playing field and allay such worries, 
Balkin proposes that we draw on principles of fiduciary law that assign 
one actor (the fiduciary) “special obligations of loyalty and trustworthi-
ness” toward another actor (the beneficiary).17  As Balkin emphasizes, 
fiduciary relationships have been created in a variety of contexts, in-
cluding where ordinary individuals surrender sensitive information to a 
professional expert — such as a doctor, lawyer, or accountant — to ob-
tain the benefit of the fiduciary’s valuable-yet-not-fully-comprehensible 
skills and services.18 
The principal goal of designating digital companies as fiduciaries for 
their users, Balkin explains, is to prevent these companies from engaging 
in “egregious . . . bad behavior.”19  No longer will they be able to “act 
like con artists.”20  “The long-term goal is to create legal incentives” for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
purposes of this analysis, we focus above all on Facebook, both because Facebook is Balkin’s main 
example of a digital information fiduciary and because it is the company whose practices have most 
galvanized privacy reformers in recent years.  Facebook also happens to offer a particularly stark 
case study in the inadequacies of the information-fiduciary framework. 
 15 Balkin, Digital Age, supra note 5. 
 16 Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 12; see also Balkin, Algorithmic Society, supra 
note 5, at 1162 (“End-users are transparent to these organizations, but their operations are not 
transparent to end-users, and it is difficult if not impossible to monitor their operations.”). 
 17 Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1207.  Throughout this Article, we will use 
“beneficiaries” as a catch-all term for those to whom fiduciary obligations are owed. 
 18 See Balkin, Algorithmic Society, supra note 5, at 1160 (discussing the development of fiduci-
ary relationships in settings where a “client relies on the fiduciary to perform valuable services” but 
“is not well-equipped to understand and monitor the fiduciary’s operations”). 
 19 Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 11. 
 20 Balkin, Three Laws of Robotics, supra note 7, at 1229; Balkin, Algorithmic Society, supra note 
5, at 1163; Balkin, Triangle, supra note 5, at 2053; see also Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: 
U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1094–
95 (2019) (echoing Balkin’s “con artist” formulation and surveying how advocates of the information- 
fiduciary framework have defined the obligations that digital fiduciaries would owe their users).  
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the development of “public-oriented” corporate cultures and industry 
norms.21  Importantly, Balkin maintains that these goals can be pursued 
without running afoul of the First Amendment22 or disrupting “the basic 
business model of free or subsidized online services” furnished in ex-
change for the collection and monetization of user data.23  A fiduciary 
approach, in the words of Balkin’s collaborator Professor Jonathan 
Zittrain, “protects consumers and corrects a clear market failure without 
the need for heavy-handed government intervention.”24 
Assessing these claims requires consideration of, among other things, 
the legal status quo faced by the relevant companies.  Start with corpo-
rate law.25  Balkin’s central example of a purported information fiduci-
ary, Facebook, is a Delaware corporation.26  So are his other main ex-
amples, Google, Twitter, and Uber.27  Under Delaware law, the officers 
and directors of a for-profit corporation already owe fiduciary duties — 
to the corporation and its stockholders.  Although the doctrinal details 
are complex, the core duty of loyalty is fairly straightforward.  As the 
Court of Chancery explained in 2017, “Delaware case law is clear” that 
to act loyally, officers and directors “must, within the limits of [their] 
legal discretion, treat stockholder welfare as the only end, considering 
other interests only to the extent that doing so is rationally related to 
stockholder welfare.”28  Or put another way: “Non-stockholder constit-
uencies and interests can be considered, but only instrumentally, . . . 
when giving consideration to them can be justified as benefiting the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 11. 
 22 See infra section IV.A, pp. 530–34 (reviewing and critiquing this line of argument).  
 23 Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1227. 
 24 Zittrain, How to Exercise, supra note 5. 
 25 Part III turns, briefly, to consumer protection and contract law. 
 26 See Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 6 (Feb. 1, 2012) (listing Delaware 
as Facebook’s jurisdiction of incorporation).  
 27 See Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 1 (Apr. 29, 2004); Twitter, Inc., Regis-
tration Statement (Form S-1), at 9 (Oct. 3, 2013); Uber Techs., Inc., Registration Statement (Form 
S-1), at 13 (Apr. 11, 2019).  Additional companies that Balkin has characterized as information 
fiduciaries, including Airbnb and OkCupid, are likewise Delaware corporations.  See Balkin, Three 
Laws of Robotics, supra note 7, at 1230; Airbnb, Inc., Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form 
D) (Mar. 9, 2017); Match Grp., Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 8 
(Nov. 9, 2015).  Microsoft also makes Balkin’s list and is incorporated in the state of Washington.  
See Jack M. Balkin, Lecture, The First Amendment in the Second Gilded Age, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 
979, 1006 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin, Second Gilded Age]; MICROSOFT CORP., AMENDED AND 
RESTATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF MICROSOFT CORPORATION 1 (Nov. 24, 2009); 
cf. Shanika Weerasundara, State of the “Incorporation” — Delaware or Washington?, TEQLAA 
(Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.teqlaa.com/state-of-the-incorporation-delaware-or-washington [https:// 
perma.cc/S7G5-749V] (stating that “Washington corporate law is largely similar to Delaware law” 
and that “Washington courts often refer to Delaware case law as guidance” in interpreting the 
Washington Business Corporation Act).  
 28 Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108, 2017 WL 1437308, at *17 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 24, 2017) (quoting Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Cor-
porate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71, 107 (2015)).  
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stockholders.”29  In 2013, Delaware created by statute a new category of 
corporations, public benefit corporations, whose directors are permitted 
to “balance[] the pecuniary interests of the stockholders” against “the 
best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct” 
and other public values.30  The creation of this category reinforces the 
conventional view that Delaware fiduciary law simply “does not permit 
traditional corporations to consider non-stockholder constituencies.”31 
Right off the bat, these observations give reason to question the fea-
sibility, if not also the coherence, of applying the information-fiduciary 
idea to the leading social media companies.  A fiduciary with sharply 
opposed loyalties teeters on the edge of contradiction.32  Insofar as the 
interests of stockholders and users diverge, the officers and directors of 
these companies may be put in the untenable position of having to vio-
late their fiduciary duties (to stockholders) under Delaware law in order 
to fulfill their fiduciary duties (to end users) under the new body of law 
that Balkin proposes — at least barring some sort of “heavy-handed 
government intervention”33 that clearly prioritizes the latter set of duties. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 Id. at *17 n.14 (quoting Leo E. Strine, Jr., Essay, The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-
Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 771 (2015)); see also eBay Domestic Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (stating that Delaware fiduciary principles 
require directors “to maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the ben-
efit of its stockholders”); Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 61, 64 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 
2019) (“In Delaware, at least, . . . a corporate fiduciary’s duties ultimately are owed to the share-
holders alone.”). 
 30 Act of July 17, 2013, ch. 122, § 8, 79 Del. Laws ch. 122, 1, 3 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 365(a) (2019)).  
 31 ELLEN J. ODONER, STEPHEN A. RADIN, LYUBA A. GOLTSER & ANDREW E. 
BLUMBERG, MILLSTEIN CTR. FOR GLOB. MKTS & CORP. OWNERSHIP, FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS IN UNCERTAIN TIMES 4 (2017), https://millstein.law.columbia. 
edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/105715_millstein_fiduciary_duties.pdf [https://perma.cc/9K5Y-
RYMR].  The extent to which Delaware fiduciary law actually protects shareholders against man-
agerial negligence and self-dealing, compliance failures that result in penalties on the firm, and 
other bad behavior by corporate officers has been debated for decades.  See generally Velasco, supra 
note 29, at 62–63 (discussing the many “compromises” made by corporate fiduciary law to conserve 
legal resources and minimize “interference with risky business decisions,” id. at 63).  In her response 
to this Article, Professor Tamara Piety contends that Delaware law has not proven an effective 
deterrent to much of this behavior and that this track record supplies an additional reason for 
skepticism about Balkin’s proposal.  Tamara Piety, Radical Skepticism About Information Fiduci-
aries, LAW & POL. ECON. (May 31, 2019), https://lpeblog.org/2019/5/31/radical-skepticism-about-
information-fiduciaries [https://perma.cc/757G-ENQT]. 
 32 Cf. Paul B. Miller, Multiple Loyalties and the Conflicted Fiduciary, 40 QUEEN’S L.J. 301, 
303, 306 (2014) (explaining that the beneficiary’s “right to [the fiduciary’s] loyalty is commonly un-
derstood as being an exclusive claim enjoyed by the beneficiary over the exercise of discretionary 
power by a fiduciary,” id. at 303, but noting that there are some “difficult” cases in which fiduciaries 
are “authorized to act in the face of a known conflict,” id. at 306).  We consider in Part II how some 
of the standard legal strategies for managing conflicts among classes of beneficiaries might be 
mapped onto Balkin’s proposal. 
 33 Zittrain, How to Exercise, supra note 5. 
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It is not hard to imagine how the interests of a social media com-
pany’s stockholders and users could come apart.  We will return to this 
point in section II.B, but just consider for a moment Facebook’s situa-
tion.  Facebook is primarily a digital advertising venture.  It charges 
users no monetary price for using the platform and instead makes the 
vast majority of its revenue through selling targeted advertising place-
ments to third parties.34  Like other corporations with comparable busi-
ness models, Facebook therefore has a strong economic incentive to 
maximize the amount of time users spend on the site and to collect and 
commodify as much user data as possible.35  By and large, addictive 
user behavior is good for business.36  Divisive and inflammatory content 
is good for business.37  Deterioration of privacy and confidentiality 
norms is good for business.38  Reforms to make the site less addictive, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 34 See Facebook’s Annual Revenue from 2009 to 2018, by Segment (in Million U.S. Dollars), 
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/267031/facebooks-annual-revenue-by-segment [https:// 
perma.cc/L2LA-MD4P] (indicating that over 98.5% of Facebook’s total revenue in 2018, more than 
$55 billion, came from advertising).  This is not true of dating sites or of gig-economy companies 
like Uber and Airbnb, which charge customers for services.  See, e.g., IAC/Interactive Corp., Annual 
Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Mar. 1, 2018); Uber Techs., Inc., supra note 27, at F-30 to F-31. 
 35 As Balkin notes, “advertising revenues depend on the amount of time and attention spent on 
the site.”  Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 2. 
 36 See generally ADAM ALTER, IRRESISTIBLE: THE RISE OF ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE BUSINESS OF KEEPING US HOOKED (2017). 
 37 See Sue Halpern, Apologize Later, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www. 
nybooks.com/articles/2019/01/17/facebook-apologize-later [https://perma.cc/E469-NEH8] (“While 
the formula [Facebook] came up with was quite simple — growth is a function of engagement — it 
so happened that engagement was best served by circulating sensational, divisive, and salacious 
content.  Allowing discordant and false material on the platform was not a glitch in the business 
plan — it was the plan.”); Emily Bell & Taylor Owen, The Platform Press: How Silicon Valley 
Reengineered Journalism, TOW CTR. FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www. 
cjr.org/tow_center_reports/platform-press-how-silicon-valley-reengineered-journalism.php [https:// 
perma.cc/EZ37-BQ7R] (“[T]he structure and the economics of social platforms incentivize the 
spread of low-quality content over high-quality material.”); Nicholas Thompson & Fred Vogelstein, 
Inside the Two Years that Shook Facebook — and the World, WIRED (Feb. 12, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/inside-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-2-years-of-hell [https://perma.cc/ 
7DUP-PFMV] (discussing the growing recognition after the 2016 presidential election “that Facebook 
had long helped to create an economic system that rewarded publishers for sensationalism, not 
accuracy or depth”).  
 38 See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED: DESIRE AND DISOBEDIENCE IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE 19 (2015) (discussing the degree to which social media companies’ data-mining and surveil-
lance practices foster and depend upon “a society of exposure and exhibition,” in which people are 
“dulled into not caring” about privacy “because there is ‘nothing to hide’ and ‘no place to hide’” 
(first quoting DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE (2011); and then quoting GLENN 
GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE (2014))); Bruce Schneier, How We Sold Our Souls — and 
More — to the Internet Giants, THE GUARDIAN (May 17, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian. 
com/technology/2015/may/17/sold-our-souls-and-more-to-internet-giants-privacy-surveillance-bruce- 
schneier [https://perma.cc/TXH6-FDV8] (explaining, with reference to Facebook, that “[s]urveil-
lance is the business model of the internet” and that people’s “tendency to undervalue privacy is 
exacerbated by companies deliberately making sure that privacy is not salient to users”). 
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to deemphasize sensationalistic material, and to enhance personal pri-
vacy would arguably be in the best interests of users.  Yet each of these 
reforms would also pose a threat to Facebook’s bottom line and there-
fore to the interests of shareholders.39 
Doctors, lawyers, accountants, and the like do not experience such 
acute tensions within their sets of fiduciary obligations.  Tensions do 
arise, both because these fiduciaries may stand to profit from selling 
beneficiaries as many products and services as possible (whatever the 
beneficiaries’ true needs) and because there may be misalignments 
among beneficiaries, as in the case of a financial servicer acting on be-
half of multiple investors40 or a law firm partner with fiduciary duties 
to her copartners as well as to her clients.41  Some of these fiduciaries 
may even be employed by publicly traded companies,42 although most 
are not; longstanding rules of professional conduct, for instance, prohibit 
nonlawyer ownership of law firms in the United States.43  Yet while 
Delaware law allows for directors’ duties to shareholders to be qualified 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 Recent market developments corroborate this concern.  In January 2018, Facebook adjusted 
its algorithm to favor more content from “friends” and less content from brands and publishers, a 
move its CEO promoted as ensuring that time spent on the platform is “time well spent.”  Mark 
Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Jan. 11, 2018, 4:28 PM), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/ 
10104413015393571 [https://perma.cc/A2MW-UX5N].  Immediately after Facebook announced 
that the adjustment had led users to spend less time on the platform, the company’s stock fell by 
five percent, “a rare decline for a company that consistently outpaces Wall Street’s estimates.”  Seth 
Fiegerman, Facebook Users Are Spending Less Time on the Site, CNN (Jan. 31, 2018, 6:01 PM), https:// 
money.cnn.com/2018/01/31/technology/facebook-earnings/index.html [https://perma.cc/97ZA-3VAY]. 
 40 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Fiduciaries with Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1867 
passim (2010) (discussing this phenomenon); see also Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate 
Law, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 87, 103 (2005) (noting that corporate directors “owe fiduciary duties to 
holders of all classes of stock even when the interests of the various classes are in conflict”). 
 41 See Robert W. Hillman, The Impact of Partnership Law on the Legal Profession, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 399 (1998) (“A lawyer as fiduciary serves two masters — the lawyer’s 
partners and the lawyer’s clients.  The differing interests of the beneficiaries of a partner’s loyalty 
obligation may diverge significantly and even be in conflict.”); cf. Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard 
B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees and 
Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 27 (1989) (describing how debtor-in-possession fiduciaries bear 
“not only the obligation to protect the estate, but also the explicit power to make choices that benefit 
some claimants and harm others”). 
 42 Numerous companies that own or operate U.S. hospitals are publicly traded, for example.  
See Publicly Traded Healthcare Facilities, INVESTSNIPS, http://investsnips.com/list-of-publicly-
traded-healthcare-facilities-blood-banks-emergency-rooms-treatment-facilities-and-urgent-care-
centers/ [https://perma.cc/8D5N-K2NK]. 
 43 See Roberta S. Karmel, Will Law Firms Go Public?, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 487, 490–91 (2013) 
(reviewing these rules and explaining that “[t]he basic concern animating [them] is that permitting 
nonlawyer ownership or direction would subject lawyers to meeting the goals of the nonlawyers 
rather than meeting their duties to clients,” id. at 491).  There has been some debate in recent years 
about whether these rules should be relaxed, as they have been in several Commonwealth countries, 
but as of now they still hold.  See generally id. at 511–25; Nick Robinson, When Lawyers Don’t Get 
All the Profits: Non-Lawyer Ownership, Access, and Professionalism, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1 (2016); Elizabeth Olson, A Call for Law Firms to Go Public, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 18, 
2015, 8:56 AM), https://nyti.ms/2jBfbxU [https://perma.cc/Z4EN-VKTS]. 
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by other legal duties,44 and while digital information fiduciaries would 
not be unique in facing crosscutting fiduciary obligations, the nature 
and scope of the conflicts they would face seem qualitatively distinct.  
As Balkin acknowledges, traditional commercial fiduciaries are not 
nearly as invested as digital firms in eliciting ongoing personal exposure 
from, or monetizing the personal data of, their customers.45  The poten-
tial conflicts between equity owners and end users that arise from these 
practices are not isolated or incidental but go to the core of the firms’ 
business. 
Traditional fiduciaries are also embedded in thicker relationships of 
care.  Doctors, lawyers, and accountants have a limited number of pa-
tients or clients on whose behalf they perform specialized tasks and ex-
ercise judgment, in all cases guided by the beneficiary’s individual pref-
erences and circumstances as well as by shared norms of a knowledge 
community.46  Within the context of such relationships, the law is gen-
erally able to manage the problem of divided loyalties by requiring fi-
duciaries to minimize self-dealing and obvious conflicts; to furnish in-
formed disclosure when conflicts are unavoidable; and, above all, to 
prioritize the interests of clients and patients over the fiduciary’s own 
interests and the interests of any other beneficiaries.47 
Would the same legal strategies work for digital information fiduci-
aries?  Can the duties they already owe to stockholders be harmonized 
with the new duties they would owe to users without doing too much 
violence either to the companies themselves or to fundamental principles 
of fiduciary law? 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 44 This is the import of the phrase “within the limits of [their] legal discretion” in the passage 
quoted earlier.  Supra p. 503 (quoting Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108, 
2017 WL 1437308, at *17 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2017)). 
 45 Balkin, Three Laws of Robotics, supra note 7, at 1229; see also Balkin, Triangle, supra note 5, 
at 2049 (contrasting social media companies and search engines, on the one hand, with doctors and 
lawyers, on the other, and remarking that the former “will always be tempted to use the data [they 
collect] in ways that sacrifice the interests of their end users to the company’s economic or political 
interests”). 
 46 On the idea of professions as knowledge communities, see Claudia E. Haupt, Professional 
Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1241–42, 1248–54 (2016). 
 47 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“The 
professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised . . . solely for the benefit of his client and free 
of compromising influences and loyalties.  Neither his personal interests, the interests of other cli-
ents, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.”); Robert 
W. Hillman, Loyalty in the Firm: A Statement of General Principles on the Duties of Partners 
Withdrawing from Law Firms, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 997, 1031 (1998) (observing that, across 
numerous areas of legal practice, “the overriding value of protecting the interests of clients serves 
to temper fiduciary duties that run between law partners”); Martha S. Swartz, “Conscience Clauses” 
or “Unconscionable Clauses”: Personal Beliefs Versus Professional Responsibilities, 6 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 269, 348 (2006) (noting that the principle “that the ‘patient’s interest 
comes first’” “appears in all medical professionals’ codes of ethics”). 
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II.  FIDUCIARIES IN WHAT SENSE? 
A.  Managing Divided Loyalties 
Balkin has never squarely addressed the issue of crosscutting loyal-
ties.48  Nor, as far as we can tell, has any other advocate of the information-
fiduciary proposal.  But it is possible to imagine at least four ways one 
might try to reconcile a corporation like Facebook’s fiduciary obligations 
to stockholders with fiduciary obligations to end users. 
First, it might be argued that Delaware law does not categorically 
demand that the interests of equity owners (or the corporation itself, 
understood in some distinct sense49) be prioritized over the interests of 
other constituencies.  If this were true, then perhaps a Facebook direc-
tor’s duties to stockholders could simply be subordinated to her duties 
to users when the two collide, much like a law firm partner’s duties to 
her fellow partners must sometimes give way to her duties to clients.  
The fundamental flaw in this argument, however, is that it runs counter 
to the prevailing understanding of Delaware doctrine — which, accord-
ing to the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, “could not have 
been more clear” since the mid-1980s “that directors of a for-profit cor-
poration must at all times pursue the best interests of the corporation’s 
stockholders.”50 
Second, it might be argued that reforms to advance the best interests 
of users by reducing addiction, limiting advertising, protecting privacy, 
and so on would also advance the best interests of an online platform 
and its shareholders, for instance because fostering trust in the present 
period may make it easier to retain and recruit users in future periods.  
Delaware law broadly permits, and on some accounts even requires, di-
rectors to take a long-run perspective.51  The fact that corporations like 
Facebook have persistently declined to self-regulate along such lines,52 
however, suggests that their boards do not see these reforms as likely to 
enhance firm value or shareholder wealth either in the short term or in 
the long term. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 48 Indeed, the term “Delaware” does not appear once in any of Balkin’s writings in this area. 
 49 See generally Robert Bartlett & Eric Talley, Law and Corporate Governance, in 1 THE 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 177, 194–99 (Benjamin E. 
Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach eds., 2017) (discussing the persistent “ambiguity” in Delaware 
fiduciary law about how to handle situations in which “the interests of the corporation writ large” 
appear to diverge from “the short-term interests of its common shareholders”). 
 50 Strine, supra note 29, at 771. 
 51 See ODONER, RADIN, GOLTSER & BLUMBERG, supra note 31, at 4. 
 52 See, e.g., DIG., CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT COMM., U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
DISINFORMATION AND “FAKE NEWS”: FINAL REPORT 20–42 (2019), https://publications. 
parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf [https://perma.cc/PC89-M39T] (de-
tailing how Facebook has repeatedly taken actions that increased revenue at the expense of users’ 
privacy and data security).  
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Third, as alluded to above,53 corporate law might be modified 
through state or federal legislation to authorize or compel platforms to 
put users’ interests ahead of stockholders’ interests (either in general or 
in specific respects).  In a much-noted 2016 essay in The Atlantic, Balkin 
and Zittrain call for a preemptive federal statute to strike “a new, grand 
bargain organized around the idea of fiduciary responsibility.”54  As they 
describe it, however, the state and local laws this statute would displace 
are not laws about shareholder primacy but rather “laws about online 
privacy.”55  At no point has Balkin or Zittrain indicated that their pro-
posal would require modification of companies’ existing fiduciary duties 
to accommodate new duties to users. 
On the contrary, information-fiduciary advocates generally appear 
to endorse a fourth and final strategy for managing conflicts between 
stockholders and users, which is to cabin any fiduciary duties afforded 
to users so that they do not seriously threaten firm value — and thus 
might even be implemented by judges in the absence of legislation.56  
Balkin has stated repeatedly that the new obligations he would impose 
on entities like Facebook, Google, and Twitter are “more limited” than 
the obligations imposed on lawyers, doctors, and accountants.57  One 
way to understand this formulation is as an effort to elicit better behav-
ior from digital companies without undermining the shareholder- 
primacy norm.  If traditional professional fiduciaries must temper their 
duties to any other beneficiaries with a higher duty of loyalty to patients 
and clients, it seems that Facebook, Google, and Twitter would, as a 
rule, have to temper their duties to users with a higher duty of loyalty 
to shareholders.  Delaware law would remain unaffected.  The interests 
of shareholders would still come first.58 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 53 See supra p. 504. 
 54 Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 5. 
 55 Id. 
 56 It is unclear whether, and how, Balkin believes judges could implement his proposal on their 
own, without prior statutory or regulatory reform, but certain passages seem to hold out the possi-
bility of a lead role for courts in creating as well as enforcing new fiduciary obligations.  See, e.g., 
Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 15 (asserting that one advantage of the fiduciary 
approach is “[i]t can be implemented . . . by judges, legislatures, or administrative agencies”);  
Balkin, Digital Age, supra note 5 (suggesting that “common law courts,” as distinct from “the state,” 
might “treat online service providers as information fiduciaries”). 
 57 E.g., Balkin, Three Laws of Robotics, supra note 7, at 1229; Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, 
supra note 5, at 1226; Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 12. 
 58 For the reasons given in the main text, this strikes us as the most natural reading of the 
literature to date.  In recent conversations, Balkin has informed us that he assumes the corporate-
law fiduciary duties owed by digital platform directors would have to be curtailed in important 
respects to operationalize his proposal.  That is, Balkin embraces some version of the third strategy 
on our list.  We will consider this Article a (partial) success if it pushes Balkin and other advocates 
of the information-fiduciary idea to clarify their position here — and to grapple explicitly with the 
question of whether and to what extent they envision sacrificing stockholders’ economic interests 
to advance users’ noneconomic interests. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3341661 
  
510 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 133:497 
Pursuant to this strategy, reformers may indeed be able to mitigate 
the problem of conflicting fiduciary obligations and purchase legal  
coherence — but at a steep price.  For if the concept of digital infor-
mation fiduciaries does not require online platforms to place their users’ 
interests above all other interests, it is unclear what work the concept is 
supposed to be doing.  More than that, it is unclear how this is a fiduci-
ary approach in any meaningful sense. 
B.  Online Behavioral Advertising and the  
Implausibility of Putting Users First 
Balkin is quick to emphasize that fiduciary duties are not one-size-
fits-all in the law and that they can and do vary from context to con-
text.59  This is true, but within limits.  The one thing that does not vary, 
in contexts where professional firms owe fiduciary duties to individual 
customers, is that the fiduciary always must act in the customer’s best 
interest.  As Zittrain himself has written, “at its core [a fiduciary rela-
tionship] means that the professionals are obliged to place their clients’ 
interests ahead of their own.”60 
Abandon this core tenet, and it is unclear what is left of the legal 
analogy to doctors, lawyers, accountants, and estate managers.  The  
social media executive who is exhorted to treat users well (and prohib-
ited from engaging in certain especially egregious behaviors) yet not  
required to place users’ interests first resembles, instead, the used-car 
dealers and restaurateurs who are classic examples in the case law of 
service providers who are not ordinarily fiduciaries for their custom-
ers.61  “Although each of these relationships involves significant infor-
mation asymmetries,” as Professor Evan Criddle has explained, “the  
relationships are all presumptively arm’s-length; none by definition  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 59 See, e.g., Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1223 (“[A] changing society gener-
ates new kinds of fiduciary relations and fiduciary obligations that the law can and should recog-
nize.  The scope of the fiduciary duty, however, is not the same for every entity.”); Balkin, Digital 
Age, supra note 5 (“[T]here are many types of fiduciary duties.”).  
 60 Zittrain, Fix This Mess, supra note 5; see also Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1944) 
(citing Winter v. Anderson, 275 N.Y.S. 373, 376 (App. Div. 1934)) (“The fiduciary must subordinate 
his individual and private interests to his duty to the corporation whenever the two conflict.”); John 
C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1658 (1989) (describing as the “central conceptual difference” between 
contracting parties and fiduciaries “that a contracting party may seek to advance his own interests 
in good faith while a fiduciary may not”); Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory 
of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 350 (2009) (“In all cases the fundamental fiduciary duty is 
to exercise the entrusted power exclusively for the other-regarding purposes for which it is held or 
conferred.”). 
 61 See Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95 TEX. L. 
REV. 993, 1041 (2017).  
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involves an entrustment of power from one party to another to be exer-
cised under a purposive and other-regarding mandate.”62  Again, the 
United States Congress or the Delaware General Assembly could impose 
a broad user-regarding mandate on social media companies and thereby 
try to create duties of loyalty and care where none currently exist.  But 
to succeed in this effort and wind up with anything recognizable as a 
fiduciary relationship, it seems to us that the legislators would have to 
force fundamental changes in the companies’ business practices — 
changes that information-fiduciary advocates have suggested are unnec-
essary and unwarranted63 — and preempt or dilute the stockholder- 
regarding norms under which the companies currently operate. 
Part III will consider the practices that digital information fiduciar-
ies, on Balkin’s account, would be barred from engaging in.  But Balkin 
is clear that at least one core practice would survive his reforms: the 
selling of targeted advertisements tied to personally identifiable infor-
mation.64  This concession alone highlights how strained the fiduciary 
designation is here.  A business model built around behavioral advertis-
ing65 demands that companies like Facebook assemble a maximally  
detailed portrait of their users’ lives, which the companies then sell to 
marketers and developers.66  While targeted advertising is not new, the 
internet has vastly expanded its scope and sophistication.  Advertising 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 62 Id.  “The injuries that arise within these relationships can be remedied,” accordingly, through 
nonfiduciary regimes “such as contract law, tort law, property law, and criminal law.”  Id. 
 63 See supra notes 19–24, 54–58 and accompanying text. 
 64 See, e.g., Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1227 (“It cannot be the case that 
the basic business model of free or subsidized online services inherently violates fiduciary obliga-
tions . . . .”); Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 12 (“Social media companies and search 
engines provide free services in exchange for the right to collect and analyze personal data and 
serve targeted ads.  This by itself does not violate fiduciary obligations.”). 
 65 The Federal Trade Commission has defined online behavioral advertising as the practice, 
“typically invisible to consumers,” of “tracking . . . consumers’ online activities in order to deliver 
tailored advertising” that is more closely aligned with their “inferred interests.”  FTC, FTC STAFF 




 66 Facebook denies that it sells user data to third parties.  But as Professor Michal Kosinski has 
pointed out, any time a user clicks on an advertisement, Facebook automatically reveals facets of 
the user’s identity to the advertiser by virtue of the fact that the advertiser has paid Facebook to 
target specific types of individuals.  Michal Kosinski, Opinion, Congress May Have Fallen for  
Facebook’s Trap, but You Don’t Have To, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2zV3ih0 
[https://perma.cc/S49N-UR6M].  And as Professor Chris Hoofnagle has observed, Facebook also 
grants developers access to user data, a form of exchange that he argues should also be considered 
a “sale.”  Chris Hoofnagle, Facebook and Google Are the New Data Brokers, DIGITAL LIFE 
INITIATIVE @ CORNELL TECH (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.dli.tech.cornell.edu/blog/facebook-
and-google-are-the-new-data-brokers [https://perma.cc/6YFK-9NQK]. 
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of this sort may have some benefits.67  Balkin asserts that it “allows more 
efficient advertising campaigns” and can “give social media [companies] 
opportunities to structure and curate content for end users that they will 
find most engaging and interesting.”68  Yet, as long as such companies 
make most of their money through personally targeted advertisements, 
they will be economically motivated to extract as much data from their 
users as they can — a motivation that runs headfirst into users’ privacy 
interests as well as any interests users might have in exercising behav-
ioral autonomy or ensuring that their personal data is not stolen, sold, 
mined, or otherwise monetized down the line.69 
Balkin acknowledges that permitting online providers to collect per-
sonal data and serve targeted advertisements “creates a perpetual con-
flict of interest” between the providers and their users.70  Rather than 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 Experts debate whether and under what conditions online behavioral advertising actually 
enhances consumer welfare.  See, e.g., Veronica Marotta, Kaifu Zhang & Alessandro Acquisti, Who 
Benefits from Targeted Advertising? 2–5 (Oct. 8, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/10/00037-100312.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/8BZ3-V8NW] (reviewing potential costs and “benefits of increasingly widespread and 
precise collection and usage of consumer data for the targeting of online ads,” id. at 2, and devel-
oping a model that suggests consumer welfare is generally higher “when less information is ex-
changed” with advertisers, id. at 5 (emphasis added)).  
 68 Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 2. 
 69 Some predict that the GDPR will lead to fundamental changes in the business models of 
Facebook and other behavioral-advertising-based companies, at least in the European Union.  See, 
e.g., Kimberly A. Houser & W. Gregory Voss, GDPR: The End of Google and Facebook or a New 
Paradigm in Data Privacy?, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 1, 2018, at 1, 109, https://jolt.richmond. 
edu/files/2018/11/Houser_Voss-FE.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX8S-LNT9] (arguing that the GDPR 
“may be an end to Facebook and Google as they currently operate”); Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-
Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 115, 143 (2017) (stating that the 
GDPR’s ban on tying, or the extension of “terms within a single contractual agreement . . . to  
include processing of personal data beyond that which is necessary to the purpose of the contract,” 
“takes aim at myriad new digital business models based around data trade”); Henry Farrell &  
Abraham Newman, Here’s How Europe’s Data Privacy Law Could Take Down Facebook, WASH. 
POST: MONKEY CAGE (May 25, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2018/05/25/heres-how-europes-gdpr-may-take-down-facebook [https://perma.cc/GQV2-
DL65] (“Privacy activist Max Schrems and his new organization . . . have used the GDPR to launch 
four major court cases against Facebook and its subsidiaries.  If Schrems’s interpretation prevails, 
Facebook’s business model will be fundamentally challenged.”).  It is too early to assess these pre-
dictions.  But it is worth noting that while Facebook’s user growth in Europe initially slowed after 
the GDPR took effect in May 2018, it has since rebounded — without any evident changes to the 
company’s core business model.  See Elizabeth Schulze, Facebook’s User Growth in Europe Is 
Bouncing Back, Defying Stricter Privacy Laws, CNBC (Apr. 25, 2019, 8:11 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/25/facebook-q1-2019-user-growth-in-europe-is-bouncing-back- 
despite-gdpr.html [https://perma.cc/CM5J-BAUE].  Facebook is currently the subject of numerous 
GDPR-related investigations, including eleven by the Irish Data Protection Commission.  See  
Elizabeth Schulze, Facebook’s EU Regulator Says It “Remains to Be Seen” if Mark Zuckerberg Is Se-
rious About Privacy, CNBC (June 13, 2019, 6:26 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/13/facebook- 
investigations-by-eu-ireland-regulator-nearing-conclusions.html [https://perma.cc/3NKE-KEMN]. 
 70 Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 12; see also Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, 
supra note 5, at 1226 (“The value of end-user data, and its centrality in the business models of many 
online service providers, creates an inherent potential for conflicts of interest between the digital 
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see this as an insuperable obstacle to a fiduciary relationship, however, 
he submits that “the goal should be to ameliorate or forestall conflicts of 
interest.”71  “[T]he law should limit how social media companies can 
make money off their end users, just as the law limits how other fiduci-
aries can make money off their clients and beneficiaries.”72  Sketching 
out what these limits might look like, Zittrain suggests that a digital 
information fiduciary would be prohibited from harnessing user data to 
enable “predatory” advertisements but permitted to expose users to non-
predatory advertisements.73 
Even if we accept for argument’s sake the soundness of the predatory/ 
nonpredatory distinction in this context — although we are doubt-
ful74 — it is unclear how a digital fiduciary is supposed to fulfill its duty 
of loyalty to users under conditions of profound and “perpetual” conflict.  
Fiduciary theorists debate the best way to conceptualize the duty of  
loyalty.  On thicker, “prescriptive” accounts, a loyal fiduciary must not 
only avoid conflicts of interest but also act with “affirmative devotion”75 
or “obedience”76 toward her beneficiary.  On thinner, “proscriptive”  
accounts, the fiduciary must “avoid conflicts between pursuit of his self-
interest and fulfilment of his duty to act for the benefit of the benefi-
ciary” and “between this duty and the pursuit of others’ interests.”77  
Even under this less demanding theory of loyalty, fiduciary law cannot 
tolerate an arrangement that places the fiduciary’s economic livelihood 
and its beneficiaries’ well-being fundamentally at odds.  The whole 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
company and the end-user.”); Zittrain, Fix This Mess, supra note 5 (“It may be that aspects of an 
advertising-based business model are indeed incompatible with ethically serving users . . . .”). 
 71 Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 13.  
 72 Id. 
 73 See Zittrain, How to Exercise, supra note 5 (“A fiduciary duty wouldn’t broadly rule out 
targeted advertising — dog owners would still get dog food ads — but it would preclude predatory 
advertising, like promotions for payday loans.”). 
 74 Cf. SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A 
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 90 (2019) (“The word ‘targeted’ is another 
euphemism.  It evokes notions of precision, efficiency, and competence.  Who would guess that 
targeting conceals a new political equation in which Google’s concentrations of computational 
power brush aside users’ decision rights as easily as King Kong might shoo away an ant, all accom-
plished offstage where no one can see?”); Louise Matsakis, Facebook’s Targeted Ads Are More Complex 
Than It Lets On, WIRED (Apr. 25, 2018, 4:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebooks- 
targeted-ads-are-more-complex-than-it-lets-on [https://perma.cc/ZG2Y-WYJX] (noting that “com-
panies who use Facebook have a near-endless number of data points with which to target their 
ads,” allowing them to pick out “hyper-specific audiences with extreme precision,” and that users 
are “significantly more likely to click on . . . psychologically tailored ads”); Piety, supra note 31 
(“[L]ine drawing between [online] advertising that is ‘abusive’ or ‘manipulative,’ versus that which 
is not, . . . will not be easy: it is virtually all manipulative.”). 
 75 Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 557 
(2015). 
 76 Id. at 558. 
 77 Id. at 557 (quoting Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 257 
(2011)).  
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point of proscriptive rules implementing the duty of loyalty is to mini-
mize “biasing factors that might induce the fiduciary to subjugate the 
interests of beneficiaries” to any other end.78 
To appreciate just how odd it is to think that a behavioral-advertising 
company could be a fiduciary for its users, imagine visiting a doctor — 
let’s call her Marta Zuckerberg — whose main source of income is ena-
bling third parties to market you goods and services.  Instead of request-
ing monetary payment for services rendered, Dr. Zuckerberg floods you 
(and her two billion other patients) with ads for all manner of pills and 
procedures from the second you set foot in her office, and she gets paid 
every time you try to learn more about one of these ads or even look in 
their direction.  In fact, this is just about the only way she gets paid — 
as her financial backers are apt to remind her.  The ads themselves, 
moreover, are tightly tailored to your economic, demographic, and psy-
chological profile and to any consumer frailties you exhibit.79  They are 
also continually updated in light of information Dr. Zuckerberg collects 
on you; to be sure she does not miss anything, she has planted surveil-
lance devices all around your neighborhood as well as her office.80  Can 
this institutional sociology and incentive structure plausibly be recon-
ciled with a commitment to prioritizing your health?81 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 78 Id. 
 79 See generally Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014).  
Dr. Zuckerberg may even assign scores to patients based on their susceptibility to certain sorts of 
ads, and then share those scores with third parties.  See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Frank 
Pasquale, Essay, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 
(2014). 
 80 Your data, accordingly, is the payment you make to Dr. Zuckerberg.  Cf. Shoshana Zuboff, 
The Real Reason Why Facebook and Google Won’t Change, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 22, 2019), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/90303274/why-facebook-and-google-wont-change [https://perma.cc/ 
39HN-Q5DD] (“Users [of Facebook] are not customers . . . .  They are merely free sources of  
raw material.”). 
 81 Consider, by way of contrast with this hypothetical, the rules limiting real-life doctors from 
receiving gifts valued at $100 or more from pharmaceutical-company sales representatives.  See 
Elaine K. Howley, Do Drug Company Payments to Doctors Influence Which Drugs They Prescribe?, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 31, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://health.usnews.com/health-care/ 
patient-advice/articles/2018-08-31/do-drug-company-payments-to-doctors-influence-which-drugs-
they-prescribe [https://perma.cc/E387-9JFA] (describing these rules).  Of course, Facebook is not a 
health care provider, and prioritizing a medical patient’s interests may require very different activ-
ities and assurances than prioritizing a social network user’s interests.  Our point is simply that 
unlike doctors, Facebook does not come close to putting its customers first in any serious sense — 
notwithstanding Zuckerberg’s protestations to the contrary, see, e.g., Mark Zuckerberg, Opinion, 
The Facts About Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2019, 7:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-
facts-about-facebook-11548374613 [https://perma.cc/U4Y6-6AP6] — and that this follows from the 
structure of its business. 
  Apart from the business model, perhaps the most basic distinction between a real-life doctor 
and Facebook is that a doctor is a trained professional who makes individualized judgments, 
whereas Facebook is an automated communications network.  We bracket in this Article the deep 
questions raised by the notion that a fiduciary’s relationship with its beneficiaries could be mediated 
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In other words, the business model matters.  It determines the degree 
to which a commercial enterprise is motivated to advance the best in-
terests of its customers, or the exact opposite.  Although the economic 
incentives of commercial fiduciaries will sometimes diverge from the in-
terests of their customers and raise difficult issues at the margins — 
truly perfect alignment might obviate the need for fiduciary duties in 
the first place82 — there are cases where the degree of misalignment 
renders fiduciary loyalty implausible.  Businesses built on behaviorally 
targeted advertising appear to be one such case. 
Moreover, if Balkin’s fiduciary obligations may be too weak or too 
compromised where they apply, one might also worry that they do not 
apply widely enough.  Balkin never discusses the advertisers or content 
producers who rely on social media companies such as Facebook.  Nor 
does he discuss the millions of nonusers whose data is systematically 
swept up by Facebook through user uploads of phone and email con-
tacts83 and through “sites that use Facebook’s advertising pixel or other 
social APIs linking back to Facebook.”84  Like Facebook’s end users, 
these parties surrender to Facebook certain forms of information that 
they have an interest in keeping private.  Facebook, however, has an 
economic incentive to monetize this information as well.  For example, 
even though an advertiser is unlikely to want its marketing campaign 
data to be shared with competitors, Facebook may incorporate this data 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
almost entirely by computer algorithms, although we note that Balkin’s theory is potentially vul-
nerable on this ground as well.  As Professor Julie Cohen puts it in a response piece: 
Classic fiduciaries — doctors, lawyers, priests — operated on small scales and at human 
rhythms for a reason.  The fiduciary construct implies a mutual encounter predicated on 
the knowability of human beings as human beings, with mutually intelligible desires and 
needs.  The information fiduciaries proposal abstracts speed, immanence, automaticity, 
and scale away from that encounter and then assumes they never mattered in the first 
place. 
Julie E. Cohen, Scaling Trust and Other Fictions, LAW & POL. ECON. (May 29, 2019), 
https://lpeblog.org/2019/05/29/scaling-trust-and-other-fictions [https://perma.cc/C65Z-75J3]. 
 82 Cf. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 811 (1983) (“When the fiduciary’s 
interests coincide with those of the entrustor, the entrustor is partially protected because as the 
fiduciary acts in his own interest he will automatically act in the interest of the entrustor. . . . The 
fiduciary may have an incentive to abuse his power, however, if the loss from the joint enterprise is 
smaller than his gain from abuse of his power.”). 
 83 See Kashmir Hill, How Facebook Figures Out Everyone You’ve Ever Met, GIZMODO (Nov. 7, 
2017, 9:39 AM), https://gizmodo.com/how-facebook-figures-out-everyone-youve-ever-met-1819822691 
[https://perma.cc/E9CG-V8K8]. 
 84 Kurt Wagner, This Is How Facebook Collects Data on You Even if You Don’t Have an Account, 
VOX: RECODE (Apr. 20, 2018, 1:02 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/20/17254312/facebook- 
shadow-profiles-data-collection-non-users-mark-zuckerberg [https://perma.cc/7GAG-J8EZ]; see 
also David Ingram, Facebook Fuels Broad Privacy Debate by Tracking Non-Users, REUTERS (Apr. 
15, 2018, 7:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-privacy-tracking/facebook-fuels-
broad-privacy-debate-by-tracking-non-users-idUSKBN1HM0DR [https://perma.cc/FZ2M-LM22] 
(“Facebook often installs cookies on non-users’ browsers if they visit sites with Facebook ‘like’ and 
‘share’ buttons, whether or not a person pushes a button.”); Wagner, supra (“There is no way to opt 
out of this kind of data collection.”). 
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into its algorithms regardless — thereby passing on to rivals the benefits 
of the advertiser’s proprietary information.  Many advertisers and con-
tent producers are just as captive to Facebook as its end users are, or 
even more so.  Insofar as the purpose of the information-fiduciary pro-
posal is to rebalance the relationship between dominant online interme-
diaries and those who depend on them, it is unclear why its protections 
should cover only one set of dependents. 
C.  Constructed Vulnerability 
Beyond their reliance on targeted advertising, certain online plat-
forms have other features that strain the fiduciary paradigm.  Balkin 
notes that a hallmark of the expertise-based fiduciary relationships on 
which he focuses is that the fiduciary stands in a position of power over 
the beneficiary.85  The sources of this relational power are typically two-
fold.  First, the fiduciary possesses professional skills and competencies 
that the beneficiary lacks.  This explains both why the beneficiary is 
seeking the fiduciary’s services and why she is hampered in monitoring 
the fiduciary’s conduct.  Second, obtaining the fiduciary’s services re-
quires the beneficiary to disclose personal information that the fiduciary 
could potentially abuse.86  The fiduciary’s expertise and the benefi-
ciary’s vulnerability are thus interrelated in a deep sense. 
Balkin suggests that end users’ relationships with online platforms 
involve a similar combination of (1) valuable expertise and (2) personal 
exposure necessary to enlist that expertise.87  Each proposition warrants 
scrutiny. 
Whether an online platform offers expertise may vary.  In the case 
of Facebook, users are offered, first and foremost, access to a communi-
cations network, a vast infrastructure for social and economic  
exchange.88  Facebook employs hundreds of skilled professionals, such 
as the software engineers who create and maintain its database applica-
tions and search functions.  But so do automobile manufacturers, oil and 
gas outfits, and any number of other firms not traditionally seen as  
fiduciaries for their customers.  Expertise underwrites commercial fidu-
ciary law only insofar as it enables specialized, individualized judgments 
and services to be rendered on the beneficiary’s behalf.  Individuated 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 85 See, e.g., Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1216–17.  
 86 See id.; see also Frankel, supra note 82, at 810 (“The delegated power that enables the fiduci-
ary to benefit the entrustor also enables him to injure the entrustor, because the purpose for which 
the fiduciary is allowed to use his delegated power is narrower than the purposes for which he is 
capable of using that power.”). 
 87 See, e.g., Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1222 (“[E]nd-users’ relationships 
with many online service providers involve significant vulnerability, because online service provid-
ers have considerable expertise and knowledge and end-users usually do not.  Online service pro-
viders have lots of information about us, and we have very little information about them . . . .”). 
 88 Cf. K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Re-
vival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1669 (2018) (describing Facebook, 
Google, and Amazon as leading “examples of online-enabled infrastructure for the modern economy”).  
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experience on Facebook is largely limited to choosing certain settings 
and inputting certain information (friends requested, groups joined, 
posts “liked”), which trigger a series of automated responses.  Maintain-
ing a twenty-first-century version of the Yellow Pages coupled with a 
communications infrastructure and search database requires significant 
technical expertise, to be sure, but not the kind of expertise that has 
helped justify fiduciary relationships in the past. 
The one Facebook service that has involved a more context-sensitive 
form of judgment is content moderation.  Content moderation refers to 
the practice of establishing and enforcing a set of rules to govern which 
kinds of speech are permitted on a platform.89  Facebook’s content mod-
erators, however, do not apply their judgment for the benefit of any 
given user.  Rather, they are called upon to protect community standards 
and the economic viability of the platform as a whole.90  In this way, an 
online content moderator is more akin to a traffic cop — applying rules 
that benefit the collective and keep traffic flowing — than to a doctor 
or a lawyer.  The fact that Facebook outsources the vast majority of its 
content moderation jobs,91 moreover, is some indication that it does not 
view the service as a core part of the business.92 
What about exposure?  Here, too, the nature of the problem is nota-
bly distinct.  Unlike in the case of obtaining legal advice or medical care, 
the sharing of intimate personal information with the provider is not a 
functional prerequisite to accessing Facebook or any other social media 
network.  It is the price the online providers have chosen to set.  Doctors 
and lawyers need to learn sensitive details about the individuals who 
engage their services to be able to serve them well.  Social media com-
panies do not. 
The loss of privacy and control experienced by Facebook users there-
fore does not stem, organically, “from the structure and nature of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 89 For an overview and analysis of how platforms like Facebook moderate user-generated con-
tent, see Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online 
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1630–62 (2018).  
 90 See, e.g., id. at 1625 (“Platforms create rules and systems to curate speech out of a sense of 
corporate social responsibility, but also, more importantly, because their economic viability depends 
on meeting users’ speech and community norms.”). 
 91 See Casey Newton, The Trauma Floor, THE VERGE (Feb. 25, 2019, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/25/18229714/cognizant-facebook-content-moderator-interviews-
trauma-working-conditions-arizona [https://perma.cc/6L87-EYUB] (detailing the psychological 
trauma that contractors may endure as part of their content moderation jobs, which pay a fraction 
of what full-time Facebook employees make); Queenie Wong, Facebook Content Moderation Is an 
Ugly Business.  Here’s Who Does It, CNET (June 19, 2019, 12:53 PM), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-content-moderation-is-an-ugly-business-heres-who-does-it 
[https://perma.cc/DHQ9-GVMD] (listing companies that have contracted with Facebook to provide 
content moderation). 
 92 Cf. ZUBOFF, supra note 74, at 508–09 (discussing the secretive, “outcast function of ‘content 
moderation,’” id. at 508, which always “operates at a distance from the corporation’s core func-
tions,” id. at 509). 
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fiduciary relation.”93  It stems from Facebook’s deliberate efforts to cre-
ate such vulnerabilities.  Facebook’s dominant market position supports 
this strategy.  To the extent that users feel beholden to Facebook, it is 
not because the company offers them especially skillful services or judg-
ments so much as because of a lack of viable alternatives.94  By virtue 
of owning four of the top five social media applications, Facebook makes 
it difficult to escape the company’s ecosystem.95  As legal scholars96 and 
German antitrust authorities97 have concluded, this market position en-
ables Facebook to extract more data from its users — who often feel they 
have nowhere else to go — and thereby compounds their vulnerability. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 93 Frankel, supra note 82, at 810 (emphasis omitted).  
 94 This raises another point of disanalogy with traditional professional fiduciaries: unlike  
Balkin’s information fiduciaries, traditional fiduciaries not only tend to “operate[] on small scales,” 
Cohen, supra note 81, but they also generally face meaningful competition, see Frankel, supra note 
82, at 814–15.  The need to compete with others in their profession gives doctors and lawyers a 
business reason to serve the interests of their beneficiaries.  This is especially true today, when 
patients and clients can publicly post ratings and reviews.  Dominant digital platforms, by contrast, 
operate in concentrated markets.  While the targeted-advertising-based business model of these 
platforms creates (from a user’s perspective) bad incentives, the underlying market structure atten-
uates good incentives. 
 95 In 2017, the top five most popular social media applications were WhatsApp, Facebook, Mes-
senger, Instagram, and Snapchat.  Michael Grothaus, Facebook Owns Four of the Five Most Down-
loaded Apps in 2017, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/4035007/ 
facebook-owns-four-of-the-five-most-downloaded-apps-in-2017 [https://perma.cc/PT9G-MAUG].  
Facebook purchased Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014.  See Nathan Reiff, Top Companies 
Owned by Facebook, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/ 
personal-finance/051815/top-11-companies-owned-facebook.asp [https://perma.cc/4AFP-XGJC].  
In 2013, Facebook reportedly attempted to purchase Snapchat, but Snapchat rebuffed the offer.  
See John Shinal, Mark Zuckerberg Couldn’t Buy Snapchat Years Ago, and Now He’s Close to De-
stroying the Company, CNBC (July 14, 2017, 6:08 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/12/how-
mark-zuckerberg-has-used-instagram-to-crush-evan-spiegels-snap.html [https://perma.cc/P6FF-
F6U4].  Users who decided to leave Facebook in light of recent privacy breaches discovered to their 
dismay that cutting it out entirely would require deleting Instagram and WhatsApp as well.  See 
Will Oremus, If You Delete Facebook, Do You Also Have to Delete Instagram and WhatsApp?, 
SLATE (Dec. 22, 2018, 5:45 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/12/can-you-deletefacebook-if-
you-dont-also-delete-instagram-and-whatsapp.html [https://perma.cc/2LQ7-P5XG]; see also id. (“Af-
ter all, the unfortunate reality is that there aren’t a lot of prominent social networks that Facebook 
doesn’t own.”). 
 96 See Dina Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook: A Monopolist’s Journey Towards 
Pervasive Surveillance in Spite of Consumers’ Preference for Privacy, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 39, 
40 (2019) (arguing that Facebook’s ability to extract so much data from users “is merely this titan’s 
form of monopoly rents”). 
 97 See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt Prohibits Facebook from Combining 
User Data from Different Sources 2 (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/ 
Publikation/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/07_02_2019_Facebook.pdf?_blob=publicationFile&v=2 
[https://perma.cc/A527-RYHE] [hereinafter Bundeskartellamt Press Release] (describing a February 
2019 decision by the German national competition regulator concluding that “[t]he extent to which 
Facebook collects, merges[,] and uses data in user accounts constitutes an abuse of a dominant 
position”).  In August 2019, the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf issued a preliminary ruling 
suspending the Bundeskartellamt’s Facebook decision.  See Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf Aug. 
26, 2019, VI-Kart 1/19, http://www.olg-duesseldorf.nrw.de/behoerde/presse/Presse_aktuell/20190826_ 
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By glossing over these points of disanalogy with doctors and lawyers, 
Balkin’s proposal risks obscuring the contingent and constructed char-
acter of the power imbalances that exist between ordinary individuals 
and the major online providers — imbalances that stem both from the 
business model these firms employ and from the market dominance they 
enjoy.  This blind spot, in turn, risks foreclosing a broader discussion 
about interventions that might prevent those imbalances from arising in 
the first place. 
D.  First-Order and Second-Order Information Asymmetries 
Implicit in the discussion above, traditional fiduciary relationships 
are marked by asymmetries of information.  The duty of loyalty re-
sponds to these asymmetries by committing the fiduciary to the benefi-
ciary’s best interests and thereby allowing the beneficiary “to take ad-
vantage of the [fiduciary’s] superior information and expertise” without 
having “to expend significant resources to monitor the [fiduciary’s] be-
havior.”98  In justifying his proposal, Balkin emphasizes that there are 
“strong asymmetries of information” between end users and online plat-
forms, whose “operations, algorithms, and collection practices are mostly 
kept secret” and might be hard to interpret even if they were disclosed.99  
Balkin is surely right about this. 
Yet not all information asymmetries are asymmetric in the same way.  
We might describe the information asymmetries that obtain in tradi-
tional fiduciary settings as second-order asymmetries: while the benefi-
ciary may not grasp or even hear about any number of technical details 
concerning the fiduciary’s efforts on her behalf, she understands the core 
terms of their relationship.100  This shared understanding enables the 
beneficiary to give meaningful consent and, in many cases, to exercise 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
PM_Facebook/20190826-Beschluss-VI-Kart-1-19-_V_.pdf [https://perma.cc/BTY4-7PPJ], trans-
lated in OLG Düsseldorf on Facebook, 26 August 2019, a Non-Translation, D’KART (Aug. 26, 2019), 
https://www.d-kart.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OLG-D%C3%BCsseldorf-Facebook-2019-
English-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZ3W-7E8Y].  The Bundeskartellamt is currently appealing the 
regional court’s ruling to the Federal Court of Justice.  See Sara Germano, Facebook Wins Appeal 
Against German Data-Collection Ban, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2019, 5:04 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-wins-appeal-against-german-data-collection-ban-11566835967 
[https://perma.cc/U6YW-UQYA]. 
 98 Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients 
and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 390 (1990); see also Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary 
Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1244 (1995) (“[I]n fiduciary law, the duty of loyalty is 
grounded in asymmetric information.”). 
 99 Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1226. 
 100 Cf. Dennis F. Thompson, Democratic Secrecy, 114 POL. SCI. Q. 181, 185–86, 192–93 (1999) 
(distinguishing analogously between “[f]irst-order secrecy” and “second-order publicity,” id. at 185).   
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some control over the fiduciary’s behavior.101  It also identifies the di-
mension along which the fiduciary is obligated to serve the beneficiary.  
Because a patient (say) is seeking medical services, the doctor’s duty is 
to protect and promote the patient’s health interests. 
What happens when the service provider and the customer lack this 
shared understanding of the core terms of their relationship?  We might 
describe the information asymmetries that obtain in some of the digital 
settings in question as first-order asymmetries: beyond the technical de-
tails of an online platform’s operations, algorithms, and data collection 
practices, the typical user does not even understand — much less ap-
prove of — their basic contours.  Most Facebook users, to stick with 
Balkin’s main example, rely on the platform to communicate with other 
Facebook users.  According to a recent Pew Research Center survey, 
seventy-four percent of them do not know that the platform collects data 
to classify their interests and traits.102  Other surveys have found that 
an overwhelming majority of Facebook users do not want to be exposed 
to any targeted political or commercial advertisements, reflecting a “re-
sounding consumer rejection of surveillance-based ads and content.”103  
As a rule, it appears that Facebook users tend to be deeply ignorant of 
the ways the company serves (or disserves) them, and deeply unnerved 
when they find out. 
This is not just an unusually stark asymmetry of information.  It is 
an elaborate system of social control whose terms are more imposed than 
chosen.  Seen in this light, the idea that the law could convert such 
companies into fiduciaries for their users without the need for funda-
mental restructuring looks even more far-fetched. 
III.  SOLVING WHICH PROBLEMS? 
If the information-fiduciary proposal would not disrupt the basic 
business model of online platforms, what would it do to advance users’ 
interests?  And how exactly would the new fiduciary duties be enforced?  
Balkin is strikingly unclear on these questions.  Reconstructing his po-
tential answers gives still more reason to doubt that a fiduciary charac-
terization is appropriate or that his proposal is adequate to the problems 
at hand. 
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 101 Cf. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 271 (2010) (“‘Second-order’ publicity 
rules . . . give citizens a platform for participating in the development of ‘first-order’ secrets, which 
affords them a degree of comprehension and control.” (quoting Thompson, supra note 100, at 185)).  
 102 Lee Rainie, Facebook Algorithms and Personal Data, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 16, 2019), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2019/01/16/facebook-algorithms-and-personal-data 
[https://perma.cc/5494-DJHC]. 
 103 Joseph Turow & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Opinion, Mark Zuckerberg’s Delusion of Consumer 
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A.  Substantive Issues 
Supporters of the information-fiduciary proposal have touted the 
“many benefits”104 and “enormous consequences”105 its adoption would 
bring.  On closer inspection, however, the main prescriptions that Balkin 
associates with the proposal turn out not to require fiduciary law or 
theory at all.  Balkin has repeatedly suggested, for instance, that treating 
digital companies as information fiduciaries will prevent them from act-
ing like “con artists” toward their users.106  But deception is already 
prohibited by a suite of state and federal consumer protection stat-
utes,107 as well as by common law antifraud doctrines108 and ordinary 
contract law, which imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing that 
(unlike many fiduciary duties) may not be waived or contracted away 
even in arm’s-length transactions.109  When Google was accused in the 
early 2010s of acting like a con artist by biasing its search results in 
favor of its own services and passing off content from competing web-
sites as its own, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) conducted “a 
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 104 Bloomberg Editorial, supra note 9. 
 105 Ariel Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy and User Expectations, 33 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 11 (2018).  
 106 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  “At base,” Balkin recently stated, “the obligations 
of loyalty mean that digital fiduciaries may not act like con artists.”  Balkin, Fixing Social Media, 
supra note 5, at 13. 
 107 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (declaring unlawful all “unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in or affecting commerce,” id. § 45(a)(1), and empowering the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to 
prevent such acts and practices); Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Pro-
tection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 165–67 (2011) (noting that many state 
mini-FTC Acts are broader than the federal analog in their definitions of unlawful conduct, the 
remedies they afford, and their provision of private rights of action); Jim Rossi, Dynamic Incorpo-
ration of Federal Law, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 457, 463 (2016) (“Many state consumer protection agencies 
operate under ‘mini-FTC Acts’ that incorporate [FTC] definitions of ‘unfair,’ ‘deceptive,’ or ‘mis-
leading’ trade practices.”).  See generally Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State 
Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (2016) (describing the proactive role of state 
attorneys general in enforcing privacy norms under state unfair and deceptive trade acts and prac-
tices laws); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014) (describing the FTC’s growing role since the late 1990s in enforcing 
both privacy statutes and companies’ privacy policies). 
 108 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 9 
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2014). 
 109 See Paul M. Altman & Srinivas M. Raju, Delaware Alternative Entities and the Implied 
Contractual Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under Delaware Law, 60 BUS. LAW. 1469, 
1469–80 (2005) (observing that, while fiduciary duties may be modified by contract under Delaware 
law, “[t]he implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in contract law may not be waived or 
contracted away by the parties to an agreement,” id. at 1480); see also Paul MacMahon, Good Faith 
and Fair Dealing as an Underenforced Legal Norm, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2051, 2065 (2015) (“The duty 
of good faith and fair dealing has been invoked in several thousand [contemporary U.S. contract] 
cases, often successfully.  And the duty has sometimes served as the basis for strikingly liberal 
impositions of liability.”).  Standard legal definitions of good faith invoke the “absence of intent to 
defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage.”  Good Faith, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th 
ed. 2019). 
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wide-ranging investigation”110 under the Commission’s organic statute 
that asked, in essence, whether Google had “acted in good faith” toward 
its users.111 
At other points, Balkin has suggested that the information-fiduciary 
model would shelter users from “abusive”112 and “manipulat[ive]”113 cor-
porate behaviors.  But depending on how one defines these terms,114 
almost all such behaviors may likewise be proscribed by state tort law115 
or by state and federal consumer protection statutes, which prohibit “un-
fair” as well as “deceptive” practices.116  Perhaps, then, the information-
fiduciary model is best understood as a restatement or refinement of 
consumer protection law, with particular application to online privacy.117  
In that case, however, it is fair to ask why we need an abstract new 
theorization of the consumer-provider relationship, instead of an insti-
tutionally sensitive account of how existing legal norms can be more 
effectively elaborated and administered, whether by the FTC or a  
European-style data protection agency.118 
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 110 Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163, at 1 (Jan. 3, 2013) (statement regarding  
Google’s search practices), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/295971/ 
130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2KW-W5BM]; see also id. at 3 n.2. 
 111 James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 935 (2014).  Professor James 
Grimmelmann argues that the FTC was right to reject the “search bias” allegations against Google, 
but that the Commission should have given more “thought as to how to carry out” the continual 
monitoring of Google that it pledged to undertake.  Id. at 936. 
 112 E.g., Balkin, Triangle, supra note 5, at 2049; Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 
1229; see also, e.g., Balkin, Algorithmic Society, supra note 5, at 1164 (“An information fiduciary 
may not betray or abuse the trust of its end-users.”). 
 113 E.g., Balkin, Three Laws of Robotics, supra note 7, at 1229; Balkin, Triangle, supra note 5, at 
2052, 2053; Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1227, 1232. 
 114 In his most recent piece on the regulation of social media, Balkin defines manipulation as 
“techniques of persuasion and influence that (1) prey on another person’s emotional vulnerabilities 
and lack of knowledge (2) to benefit oneself or one’s allies and (3) reduce the welfare of the other 
person.”  Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 4. 
 115 See, e.g., Francesca Fontana, Lawsuits Against Facebook over Data Privacy Issues Are Piling 
Up, THESTREET (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.thestreet.com/story/14536213/1/everyone-who-is-suing- 
facebook-for-cambridge-analytica.html [https://perma.cc/829Y-GEL4] (listing privacy-related law-
suits, some of which involve tort claims, filed against Facebook in the wake of the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal). 
 116 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770(a) (West 2017). 
 117 Cf. James Grimmelmann, When All You Have Is a Fiduciary, LAW & POL. ECON. (May 30, 
2019), https://lpeblog.org/2019/05/30/when-all-you-have-is-a-fiduciary [https://perma.cc/Y762-PPTY] 
(suggesting that while fiduciary principles are ill-suited to problems of self-dealing, content moder-
ation, and market concentration on online platforms, the “best version” of U.S. information privacy 
law “would cash out fiduciary principles in specifying when and how platforms can use and share 
user data”). 
 118 A number of prominent scholars and advocates have urged the creation of such an agency in 
the United States, sometimes pointing to the failures of the FTC at protecting the privacy of online 
platform users.  See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care 
Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 66–68 (1997); EPIC to Congress: FTC Has Failed to Protect Pri-
vacy, New Data Protection Agency Urgently Needed, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (May 6, 
2019), https://epic.org/2019/05/epic-to-congress-ftc-has-faile.html [https://perma.cc/MF9A-S5LJ].  
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Balkin’s frequent refrain that digital information fiduciaries would 
have to act in “good faith” toward their users119 is telling in what it 
leaves out.  Again, all parties involved in all contracts, including terms-
of-service contracts, must always act in good faith toward each other.120  
As a matter of law, Balkin’s proposal would change nothing in this re-
gard.  What is distinctive about fiduciaries is that they are generally 
held to a standard of “utmost” good faith.121  The omission of “utmost” 
in Balkin’s narrative supplies further evidence that he does not really 
mean to hold online platforms to anything resembling traditional fidu-
ciary obligations, so much as to basic standards of honesty and decency 
to which they are already held (however imperfect the enforcement). 
This is not to say that every prescription Balkin associates with the 
information-fiduciary model would duplicate existing consumer protec-
tion or contract law.  In particular, he has suggested in recent writing 
that digital information fiduciaries would be obligated to vet third  
parties before affording them access to user data122 (although not neces-
sarily obligated to obtain users’ consent) and prohibited from encourag-
ing addiction among users.123  If adopted, both suggestions might entail 
extra legal responsibilities for online platforms.  Yet it is precisely in 
these areas where Balkin’s proposal seems to depart from current law 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Other commentators, however, suggest that the FTC may be doing a better job than European data 
protection agencies at catalyzing and enforcing consumer privacy norms.  See, e.g., Kenneth A. 
Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
247, 308–11 (2011).  For an overview of the FTC’s legal authorities and use of those authorities to 
regulate privacy and data security, see generally Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope 
and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230 (2015).  
 119 E.g., Balkin, Three Laws of Robotics, supra note 7, at 1230; Balkin, Algorithmic Society, supra 
note 5, at 1161; Balkin, Triangle, supra note 5, at 2053, 2055; Jack M. Balkin, Mark Zuckerberg 
Announces that Facebook Is an Information Fiduciary, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 21, 2018, 8:00 PM), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/03/mark-zuckerberg-announces-that-facebook.html 
[https://perma.cc/N2KV-B589]. 
 120 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 121 See Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 
458 (1987) (“[A]dmonitions concerning the duty of ‘utmost good faith’ dominat[e] judicial analyses 
of fiduciary responsibilities.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Couri v. Couri, 447 N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ill. 
1983))); David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 890 (2016) (“Fiduciaries 
of all sorts are held to a standard of ‘utmost good faith.’”). 
 122 See, e.g., Balkin, Second Gilded Age, supra note 27, at 1008 (“The duties of care and confi-
dentiality require information fiduciaries to keep data secure and not to disclose it to third parties 
unless those third parties are equally trustworthy and agree to the same duties of care, confidenti-
ality, and loyalty as the fiduciary.”); see also Dobkin, supra note 105, at 36–43 (proposing similarly 
that information-fiduciary duties should prohibit sharing data with third parties under certain cir-
cumstances); Theodore Rostow, Note, What Happens When an Acquaintance Buys Your Data?: A 
New Privacy Harm in the Age of Data Brokers, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 667, 700 (2017) (noting that, 
under Balkin’s framework, “[t]he responsibilities of information fiduciaries could be expanded to 
limit what data companies can sell to brokers”). 
 123 See, e.g., Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 14 (“[I]f social media companies are 
information fiduciaries, they should also have a duty not to use end-user data to addict end  
users . . . .”). 
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that the tensions become most acute between the fiduciary duties that 
he would create and the fiduciary duties that directors owe to share-
holders — as an online platform’s bottom line certainly could benefit 
from broad data sharing practices and addictive user behaviors.  To 
break new legal ground here, reformers may have to sacrifice share-
holder value to a degree that the information-fiduciary literature has not 
yet acknowledged or considered. 
B.  Enforcement Issues 
If Balkin is vague on the substantive legal duties that digital infor-
mation fiduciaries would owe to users, he is all but silent on how these 
new duties would be enforced.  He has been similarly silent on what the 
remedies for breach would be.  These are no small matters given the 
number of beneficiaries potentially involved, not to mention the many 
respects in which rights, remedies, and their enforcement are “inextrica-
bly intertwined.”124 
In fiduciary law generally, beneficiaries may enforce their rights in 
court125 and remedies “tend to be supracompensatory in order to deter 
abuse.”126  Judges in Delaware and beyond are often loath to “wield the 
stick” and impose legal liability,127 but across every private law context 
of which we are aware, the fiduciary relationship is a juridical relation-
ship overseen by courts.  Would the same hold true for the fiduciary 
relationship between online platforms and their end users?  Or would 
some sort of purely internal or administrative complaint process suffice? 
If private judicial enforcement is contemplated, the scale of such lit-
igation could be staggering.  As of July 2019, Facebook and Google each 
had well over 200 million monthly users in the United States alone.128  
Given that cases involving newly minted information-fiduciary duties 
would likely raise a host of novel legal issues and technical complexities, 
Balkin’s proposal has the potential to swallow judicial dockets even 
with the aid of class actions, all while further undermining the defend-
ant companies’ ability to serve their shareholder beneficiaries. 
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 124 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 
858 (1999). 
 125 See Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 
1146 (2014) (“Private law labels some relationships of power and dependence between persons ‘fi-
duciary.’  With the label come duties, enforceable through private rights of action . . . .”). 
 126 Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. 
L. REV. 699, 708 (2013).  
 127 Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public 
Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 101 (2013) (“Within the fiduciary field, courts are long on rhetoric 
precisely because they rarely wield the stick . . . .”). 
 128 See Most Popular Multi-platform Web Properties in the United States in July 2019, Based on 
Number of Unique Visitors (in Millions), STATISTA (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/ 
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If, on the other hand, private judicial enforcement is not contem-
plated, then we have to ask once again whether this is an adaptation or 
an abdication of core fiduciary principles.  Notably, the Balkin-inspired 
legislation introduced by Democratic senators in December 2018 would 
treat fiduciary breaches as actionable only by the FTC and, in the 
FTC’s absence, state attorneys general.129  Short of direct judicial en-
forcement, Balkin could alternatively urge courts to enlist fiduciary 
principles in an indirect, gap-filling manner when adjudicating contrac-
tual, tort, or statutory claims brought against online platforms.  Courts 
already do a version of this in other contexts.130  Yet while limiting  
information-fiduciary duties to indirect enforcement might halt the flood 
of lawsuits, it would relegate these duties to a supporting and possibly 
marginal legal role, rather than the starring role that advocates seem to 
have in mind, as well as to a kind of second-class status within the fi-
duciary family. 
The prospect of judicial enforcement also raises questions about how 
individual users or institutional bodies are supposed to know when an 
online platform has violated its fiduciary obligations.  In recent years, 
many of the leading examples of data breaches, privacy invasions, and 
other reckless behaviors by social media companies have been uncov-
ered by journalists, with some of the reporting coming close to two years 
after the relevant events took place.131  Robust and enterprising inves-
tigative journalism would be crucial, it seems, to identifying fiduciary 
violations by the dominant online platforms.  And yet, the stranglehold 
that these same platforms have on the digital advertising market is itself 
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 129 Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. §§ 3–4 (2018). 
 130 Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities 
Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 28 (1999) (“[T]he common law’s concept of fiduciary duty both 
enables and instructs the common law judge to fill in the gaps in an incomplete contract.”); Jonathan 
R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive 
Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 25 (similar); Pozen, supra 
note 121, at 890 (noting that principles of good faith may be used by courts “in a ‘gap-filling’ role 
to disallow conduct that otherwise would not run afoul of controlling legal texts”). 
 131 See, e.g., Issie Lapowsky, The 21 (and Counting) Biggest Facebook Scandals of 2018, WIRED 
(Dec. 20, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-scandals-2018 [https://perma.cc/ 
9EF8-4KC6]; Emily Stewart, Facebook’s Very Bad Year, Explained, VOX (Dec. 21, 2018, 11:20 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/technology/2018/12/21/18149099/delete-facebook-scandals-2018-cambridge-
analytica [https://perma.cc/MUG6-NET8]; Selina Wang, Twitter Sold Data Access to Cambridge 
Analytica–Linked Researcher, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2018, 2:17 PM), https://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/articles/2018-04-29/twitter-sold-cambridge-analytica-researcher-public-data-access 
[https://perma.cc/48EC-FMJE].  As far as we are aware, the only significant recent revelation about 
Facebook not brought to light by journalists occurred when a UK Member of Parliament pressured 
an app maker engaged in litigation against Facebook into turning over a cache of internal Facebook 
documents about data and privacy controls.  See Cyrus Farivar, Six4Three Exec “Panicked” in UK 
MP’s Office, Gave Up Facebook Internal Files, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 26, 2018, 7:10 PM), https:// 
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/11/six4three-exec-panicked-in-uk-mps-office-gave-up-facebook-
internal-files [https://perma.cc/G9MS-7CL8]. 
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one of the biggest threats to the economic viability of such reporting.132  
Whether or not any new fiduciary duties are needed, achieving effective 
legal enforcement under these conditions may require not just lawsuits 
but regular investigations and inspections, along with the imposition of 
affirmative duties to disclose data breaches and other compliance fail-
ures promptly and publicly.133 
C.  Problems Unaddressed 
The plight of journalism raises a more general issue.  If it is unclear 
which problems Balkin’s proposal would solve, it seems quite clear that 
the information-fiduciary model would leave many profound problems 
untouched.  This is not the place to offer a detailed inventory, but be-
yond the issues of privacy and data security that Balkin foregrounds, 
the dominant online platforms have been credibly associated with a host 
of social ills, from facilitating interference in U.S. elections;134 to serving 
as a tool for the incitement of genocide in Myanmar;135 to decreasing 
users’ mental and physical health;136 to enabling discrimination and  
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 132 See generally ZUBOFF, supra note 74, at 506–07; Bell & Owen, supra note 37; Daniel Funke, 
What’s Behind the Recent Media Bloodbath?  The Dominance of Google and Facebook, POYNTER 
(June 14, 2017), https://www.poynter.org/business-work/2017/whats-behind-the-recent-media-
bloodbath-the-dominance-of-google-and-facebook [https://perma.cc/3REK-L4NJ].  From 2008 to 
2018, newsroom employment in the United States dropped by twenty-five percent, while newspaper 
employment dropped by nearly double as much.  See Elizabeth Grieco, U.S. Newsroom Employ-
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(July 9, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/09/u-s-newsroom-employment-has-
dropped-by-a-quarter-since-2008 [https://perma.cc/G66K-JB3R].  Facebook also impedes investiga-
tive journalism more directly through its terms of service, which ban reporters and researchers from 
using automated collection techniques or temporary research accounts to study the platform.  See 
Alex Abdo, Opinion, Facebook Is Shaping Public Discourse. We Need to Understand How, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/15/ 
facebook-twitter-social-media-public-discourse [https://perma.cc/H4H3-D78U]. 
 133 The European Union’s major privacy law, the GDPR, requires that covered firms notify the 
relevant authorities of any data breach within seventy-two hours of having become aware of it.  
Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 52. 
 134 See, e.g., Nancy Scola, Massive Twitter Data Release Sheds Light on Russia’s Trump Strategy, 
POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2018, 10:36 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/17/twitter-foreign- 
influence-operations-910005 [https://perma.cc/5GLB-8LET] (“Twitter and Facebook have been 
widely criticized since the 2016 election for not doing more to stem the abuse of their platforms by 
Russians and other foreign actors hoping to manipulate the American political landscape.”). 
 135 See, e.g., Paul Mozur, A Genocide Incited on Facebook, with Posts from Myanmar’s Military, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2QToYQA [https://perma.cc/94LU-3NLA] (describing 
“a systematic campaign on Facebook” by members of the Myanmar military to incite violence 
against the country’s Rohingya minority group). 
 136 See, e.g., Holly B. Shakya & Nicholas A. Christakis, A New, More Rigorous Study Confirms: 
The More You Use Facebook, the Worse You Feel, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 10, 2017), 
https://hbr.org/2017/04/a-new-more-rigorous-study-confirms-the-more-you-use-facebook-the-worse-
you-feel [https://perma.cc/TS9T-ZK5D] (“[M]ost measures of Facebook use in one year predicted a 
decrease in mental health in a later year.  We found consistently that both liking others’ content 
and clicking links significantly predicted a subsequent reduction in self-reported physical health, 
mental health, and life satisfaction.”).  See generally ZUBOFF, supra note 74, at 461–65 (reviewing 
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harassment against women and racial minorities;137 to amplifying the 
influence of “fake news,” conspiracy theories, bot-generated propa-
ganda,138 and inflammatory and divisive content more broadly.139  Be-
trayal of users’ trust as to how their data will be handled is just one 
category of concerns raised by these companies, and not necessarily the 
most worrisome category. 
Many of the broader harms associated with these platforms are mag-
nified or made possible by a behavioral-advertising-based business 
model coupled with outsized market share.  While these are distinct fea-
tures — a company could have the business model without the market 
position, and vice versa — the problems they create tend to be mutually 
reinforcing.  For example, in recent years Google and Facebook together 
have captured roughly three-quarters of all digital advertising sales in 
the United States and an even higher percentage of growth.140  Their 
control over digital advertising networks appears to be an important 
factor behind the past decade’s consolidation within the publishing in-
dustry and tens of thousands of layoffs at newspapers and magazines.141  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
a “growing body of evidence [that] testifies to the psychic toll of life in the hive” of social media, id. 
at 461, especially for younger users). 
 137 See, e.g., OLIVIER SYLVAIN, EMERGING THREATS: DISCRIMINATORY DESIGNS ON 
USER DATA 3, 8–16 (David Pozen ed., 2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/kfai-documents/documents/ 
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 138 See, e.g., TIM WU, EMERGING THREATS: IS THE FIRST AMENDMENT OBSOLETE? 11–
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ELECTION: WHAT WERE MICHIGAN VOTERS SHARING OVER TWITTER? 1 (2017), http:// 
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 139 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 140 See Alex Heath, Facebook and Google Completely Dominate the Digital Ad Industry, BUS. 
INSIDER (Apr. 26, 2017, 4:48 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-and-google-dominate- 
ad-industry-with-a-combined-99-of-growth-2017-4 [https://perma.cc/4NM4-L8SN]. 
 141 Commentary on this subject is copious.  See supra note 132; see also, e.g., Josh Constine, How 
Facebook Stole the News Business, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 3, 2018, 12:10 PM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/03/facebooks-siren-call [https://perma.cc/3YRJ-RY2U]; Roy 
Greenslade, Why Facebook Is Public Enemy Number One for Newspapers, and Journalism, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2016, 4:54 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2016/sep/ 
20/why-facebook-is-public-enemy-number-one-for-newspapers-and-journalism [https://perma.cc/ 
E7XB-Y3WD]; Michael Miller, Opinion, Google Is Not Journalism’s Friend and Now It’s Trying to 
Undermine Paywalls, FIN. REV. (May 31, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.afr.com/opinion/google-is-
not-journalisms-friend-and-now-its-trying-to-undermine-paywalls-20170530-gwghgp [https:// 
perma.cc/YM3Z-P9L4].  In Farhad Manjoo’s pithy formulation, “[t]he cause of each [media] com-
pany’s troubles may be distinct, but collectively the blood bath points to the same underlying mar-
ket pathology: the inability of the digital advertising business to make much meaningful room for 
anyone but monopolistic tech giants.”  Farhad Manjoo, Opinion, Why the Latest Layoffs Are  
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As the professional media has shrunk, more and more local communities 
have been left with little to no meaningful news coverage.142  On multi-
ple interacting levels that transcend any given user’s experience, the be-
haviors of a few platforms have been affecting the fabric and functioning 
of our democracy — often for the worse. 
Against this backdrop of platform dominance and democratic decay, 
the user-centric nature of the information-fiduciary proposal should give 
pause.  The relevant inquiry for legal reformers, we submit, should be 
not just how a firm such as Google or Facebook exercises its power over 
end users, but whether it ought to enjoy that kind of power in the first 
place.  Limiting the dominance of some of these firms may well have 
salutary effects for consumer privacy, both by facilitating competition 
on privacy protection and by reducing the likelihood that any single 
data-security failure will cascade into a much wider harm.143  More than 
that, the very effort to think through the ramifications of platform power 
would force policymakers to grapple with a wide range of systemic con-
cerns that fall outside the fiduciary frame. 
To be clear, we do not believe that addressing the market clout of 
companies like Facebook will remedy the full panoply of harms associ-
ated with them.  Nor do we view antitrust enforcement as the sole tool 
for addressing this dominance.  Our point here (which we will develop 
further in section IV.B) is that any broad regulatory framework or 
“grand bargain”144 for social media that focuses on abusive data prac-
tices, without attending to issues of market structure or political- 
economic influence, is bound to be at best highly incomplete and at 
worst an impediment to necessary reforms. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Devastating to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2GgrPke 
[https://perma.cc/TGY5-4YS8]. 
 142 See, e.g., Yemile Bucay, Vittoria Elliott, Jennie Kamin & Andrea Park, America’s Growing 
News Deserts, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Spring 2017), https://www.cjr.org/local_news/american- 
news-deserts-donuts-local.php [https://perma.cc/CKL7-MSMP]; Riley Griffin, Local News Is Dying, 
and It’s Taking Small Town America with It, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 6, 2018, 10:02 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-05/local-news-is-dying-and-it-s-taking-small-town- 
america-with-it [https://perma.cc/Y6VJ-2BJ5]. 
 143 For example, one of the biggest data breaches that Facebook suffered in 2018 derived from 
the site serving as a central passport to the internet, such that one’s Facebook login can serve as a 
credential for numerous third-party sales.  Once hackers stole the single access key, they won access 
to users’ non-Facebook logins as well.  See Issie Lapowsky, The Facebook Hack Exposes an Internet- 
Wide Failure, WIRED (Oct. 2, 2018, 10:12 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-hack- 
single-sign-on-data-exposed [https://perma.cc/N53B-PJW5].  The primary problem here was not 
necessarily insufficient protection on Facebook’s part, so much as the structurally central role that 
the company plays in the digital realm.  On the general relationship between market structure and 
the capacity to absorb unexpected shocks, see BARRY C. LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW 
MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION 78–83 (2010); and Peter C. 
Carstensen & Robert H. Lande, The Merger Incipiency Doctrine and the Importance of “Redun-
dant” Competitors, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 783, 787–89, 826–45. 
 144 Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 5; see supra p. 509. 
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IV.  WITH WHAT BENEFITS AND COSTS? 
We have argued that the information-fiduciary proposal could cure 
at most a small fraction of the problems associated with online plat-
forms — and to the extent it does, only by undercutting directors’ duties 
to shareholders, undermining foundational principles of fiduciary law, 
or both.  Why, then, has the idea proven so popular? 
At a theoretical level, Balkin’s proposal is consilient as well as crea-
tive; it seems to resolve a tangle of thorny issues with a single, timeworn 
legal concept.  The failure to specify institutional or operational details 
can thus be held out as a feature, not a bug.145  At a political level, the 
proposal comes across as consumer protective yet conflict suppressive, 
promising to deliver broad social benefits without overly threatening the 
tech giants or their profits.  At an aesthetic level, there is something 
attractive about the way in which a fiduciary framework would hold 
platforms to their own rhetoric of trustworthiness.  In other areas of law, 
too, a number of legal scholars have been pressing in recent years for 
increasingly expansive accounts of fiduciary obligation.146  Perhaps the 
very idea of recasting powerful institutions as duty-bound, other-regarding 
agents, as if they “operate outside the capitalist free-for-all of exchange 
relations,”147 has become more alluring in an age of widespread anxiety 
about the state of capitalism and liberal democracy. 
Whatever the sources of its appeal (and there may be different 
sources for different audiences), the biggest legal benefit of Balkin’s pro-
posal, on his telling, is that a fiduciary framework would allow regula-
tions enacted in its name to withstand First Amendment challenges that 
might otherwise be fatal.148  Meanwhile, Balkin has clarified that his 
proposal is not meant to be a cure-all and could be complemented with 
other reforms, including “pro-competition rules or increased antitrust 
enforcement.”149  The implication is that there is no basis for worrying 
that the proposal does not accomplish enough on its own. 
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 145 See, e.g., Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 15 (“The fiduciary approach has many 
advantages.  It is not tied to any particular technology.  It can adapt to technological change.  It can be 
implemented at the state or the federal level, and by judges, legislatures, or administrative agencies.”). 
 146 See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Keeping the Promise of Public Fiduciary Theory: 
A Reply to Leib and Galoob, 126 YALE L.J.F. 192, 193 (2016) (discussing the recent “revival of public 
fiduciary theory”); Grimmelmann, supra note 111, at 904 (“[W]e are undergoing something of an 
academic fiduciary renaissance, with scholars arguing for treating legislators, judges, jurors, and 
even friends as fiduciaries.” (citations omitted)); Daniel Yeager, Fiduciary-isms: A Study of  
Academic Influence on the Expansion of the Law, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 179, 184 (2017) (describing 
“how academic writing, deploying a sense of fiduciary so open as to be empty, has influenced courts 
to designate” an ever-expanding set of actors as fiduciaries). 
 147 Yeager, supra note 146, at 183 (“Fiduciaries are said to operate outside the capitalist free-for-
all of exchange relations . . . .”). 
 148 This is a central theme of Balkin’s first, and still most extensive, academic statement of the 
proposal.  See Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1209–20. 
 149 Balkin, Fixing Social Media, supra note 5, at 15. 
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Both of these arguments are tantalizing.  But both, in our view, are 
seriously flawed.  We see little constitutional upside to the information-
fiduciary proposal and significant policy downside.  Let us consider each 
issue in turn. 
A.  The False Promise of First Amendment Flexibility 
The First Amendment, Balkin observes, “may be a potential obstacle 
to laws that try to regulate private infrastructure owners in order to 
protect end-users’ freedom of speech and privacy.”150  For example, 
broadband companies have challenged network neutrality regulations 
(unsuccessfully to date) as a violation of their corporate free speech 
rights.151  And social media companies might challenge new measures 
“restricting how they use, distribute, or sell the consumer data that they 
collect” on the ground that this data is their “speech or knowledge.”152  
First Amendment law, at least in its current “Lochnerian” form,153 
works almost exclusively to the advantage of the online platforms.   
“Instead of empowering users to challenge their policies, the First 
Amendment empowers the companies themselves to challenge statutes 
and regulations intended to promote antidiscrimination norms or users’ 
speech and privacy, among other values.”154 
If these companies were to be recognized as fiduciaries for their  
users, however, Balkin argues that the constitutional calculus would tip 
in the regulator’s favor.  He maintains that because the speech that  
occurs in fiduciary settings concerns special services rendered in the con-
text of special relationships of vulnerability and dependency, the “First 
Amendment treats information practices by fiduciaries very differently 
than it treats information practices involving relative strangers.”155  
“Generally speaking, when the law prevents a fiduciary from disclosing 
or selling information about a client — or using information to a client’s 
disadvantage — this does not violate the First Amendment, even though 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 150 Balkin, Second Gilded Age, supra note 27, at 982. 
 151 See, e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 740–44 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (rejecting a First 
Amendment challenge to a 2015 Federal Communications Commission (FCC) order imposing com-
mon carrier obligations on telecommunications companies).  But cf. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 
855 F.3d 381, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) 
(arguing that the FCC order is unconstitutional because “the First Amendment bars the Government 
from restricting the editorial discretion of Internet service providers, absent a showing that an In-
ternet service provider possesses market power in a relevant geographic market”). 
 152 Balkin, Second Gilded Age, supra note 27, at 982. 
 153 See Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Introduction, The Search for an Egalitarian First 
Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1959–64 (2018) (reviewing the contemporary debate over 
“First Amendment Lochnerism,” id. at 1962).  Roughly speaking, First Amendment Lochnerism 
refers to “a First Amendment jurisprudence that disables redistributive regulation and exacerbates 
socioeconomic inequality.”  Id. at 2007. 
 154 Id. at 1973. 
 155 Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1209. 
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the activity would be protected if there were no fiduciary relation-
ship.”156  In support of this claim, Balkin cites four state court cases, 
three from the 1970s and one from the 1990s, recognizing a doctor’s duty 
not to disclose patient information.157  He also interprets a 1985 securi-
ties law case that was decided by the Supreme Court on statutory 
grounds, Lowe v. SEC,158 as signaling that “ordinary First Amendment 
doctrine — including even the ban on prior restraints — would not ap-
ply to communications” between certain professional fiduciaries and 
their beneficiaries.159 
Balkin’s argument here is elegant and insightful, but it does not  
appear to track the approach that the Roberts Court would actually 
employ when evaluating First Amendment claims brought by online 
platforms that had been designated as fiduciaries for their users 
(whether by Congress, an administrative agency, or the Court itself).  
Last year, in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. 
Becerra,160 Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court was emphatic that 
the Court has never “recognized ‘professional speech’ as a separate cat-
egory of speech.”161  Nor did the Court see any “persuasive reason” to 
reconsider that stance now.162  There is good reason to think that Justice 
Thomas overstated this point and that certain narrow categories of pro-
fessional speech, such as doctors’ advice to patients, will continue to be 
treated differently from other categories of speech (or treated as non-
speech) under the First Amendment, unless the Court wishes to wreak 
havoc on longstanding regimes of professional licensing, informed con-
sent, and malpractice liability.163  But at a minimum, National Institute 
of Family & Life Advocates signals skepticism about Balkin’s broader 
claim that “the law does not treat speech in professional or other fiduci-
ary relationships as part of public discourse” and instead treats such 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 156 Id. at 1210. 
 157 Id. at 1210 n.120. 
 158 472 U.S. 181 (1985). 
 159 Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1219.  Balkin maintains that “most profes-
sional relationships are fiduciary relationships.”  Id. at 1209. 
 160 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 161 Id. at 2371; see also id. at 2371–72 (“Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by 
‘professionals.’”).  Justice Thomas added that the Court “has been especially reluctant to ‘exemp[t] 
a category of speech from the normal prohibition on content-based restrictions.’”  Id. at 2372 (al-
teration in original) (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722 (2012) (plurality opinion)).  
In her largely sympathetic 2016 response to Balkin, Bambauer anticipated a version of this rejoin-
der.  See Bambauer, supra note 8, at 1950 (“[A]ny attempt to harness the power of fiduciary rela-
tionships in order to achieve broad privacy policy runs into an unavoidable problem: it violates the 
cardinal rule of content-neutrality.”). 
 162 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2375. 
 163 See Claudia E. Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, 128 YALE L.J.F. 185, 188 (2018) 
(arguing forcefully that “despite the [National Institute of Family & Life Advocates] Court’s insist-
ence that it has never recognized professional speech as a category,” professional speech — when 
“narrowly defined” — is and should remain “a type of speech doctrinally distinct from others”). 
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speech “as part of ordinary social and economic activity that is subject 
to reasonable regulation.”164 
Even if the Court were to affirm some sort of relaxed standard of First 
Amendment review for regulations of traditional fiduciary-beneficiary 
communications, it is not at all clear that the Court would apply this 
standard to the special case of digital information fiduciaries.  Justice 
White’s concurring opinion in Lowe, which was joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, suggested that regulations of a profession 
should be given more lenient First Amendment treatment only when 
there is a “personal nexus between professional and client” and the pro-
fessional is “exercising judgment on behalf of [a] particular individual 
with whose circumstances he is directly acquainted.”165  A “personal 
nexus” of this sort is arguably lacking altogether in the context of online 
platforms.166  Moreover, Balkin’s crucial concession that the fiduciary 
duties owed by online platforms to their users will be “more limited”167 
than the duties of traditional fiduciaries leads naturally to the possibility 
that the government’s regulatory leeway may be more limited as well.  
Balkin is at pains to emphasize that fiduciary relationships are not  
one-size-fits-all in the law;168 why, then, should we assume that First 
Amendment review of these heterogeneous relationships will always 
take the same form? 
In short, the notion that designating online platforms as fiduciaries 
would yield a significant First Amendment payoff strikes us as resting 
on an overly simple (if not nominalist) view of how judges would re-
spond to such a designation, and as contradicted by the Roberts Court’s 
case law.  Balkin’s argument here, in any event, extends only to regula-
tions that could be characterized as speech regulations — most notably, 
restrictions on what platforms can do with the consumer data they 
gather.  It is inapplicable to other policy tools that could not plausibly 
be characterized as speech regulations even by proponents of the “data 
is speech” view,169 including most antitrust and procompetition tools; 
public certification or safe harbor programs “in which companies opt 
into various promises (backed by regulatory enforcement) in exchange 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 164 Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 5, at 1217. 
 165 Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result). 
 166 See supra sections II.B–C, pp. 510–19. 
 167 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 168 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 169 See generally Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014).  For a contrary 
perspective, see, for example, Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 
52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1169 (2005) (“I believe that most privacy regulation that interrupts information 
flows in the context of an express or implied commercial relationship is neither ‘speech’ within the 
current meaning of the First Amendment, nor should it be viewed as such.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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for” certain legal or reputational benefits;170 requirements that firms pay 
people for their data;171 data portability and interoperability man-
dates;172 co-regulation schemes that incentivize businesses to continually 
produce and share compliance information;173 and any number of front-
end limits or “taxes” on private data collection.174  Especially given the 
extraterritorial reach of the GDPR’s personal data protections,175 these 
sorts of policy tools may have more bite at this time than the regulations 
Balkin has in mind. 
Furthermore, within the domain where it does apply, we question 
whether Balkin’s argument makes the strongest case for the constitu-
tionality of public-interested platform regulation.  Balkin grounds his 
argument in the special nature of the relationships that digital infor-
mation fiduciaries, like all other fiduciaries, purportedly have with their 
beneficiaries.  First Amendment theory, however, supplies numerous 
other possible grounds for justifying regulations meant to enhance plat-
form users’ privacy, security, and control of their own data — from ar-
guments that commercial speech and computer algorithms deserve only 
modest, if any, constitutional protection;176 to the contention that online 
service providers should be treated as public trustees177 or public utili-
ties;178 to “systemic” perspectives on free speech that read the First 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 170 Bambauer, supra note 8, at 1952.  Information-fiduciary principles might themselves be insti-
tuted through a safe-harbor program, see Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 5, but so presumably could 
other, more concrete legal obligations related to the goals of the program. 
 171 See, e.g., Data Workers of the World, Unite, THE ECONOMIST (July 7, 2018), https://www. 
economist.com/the-world-if/2018/07/07/data-workers-of-the-world-unite [https://perma.cc/W8L2-
BVVQ]; Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Want Our Personal Data?  Pay for It, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 
20, 2018, 11:19 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/want-our-personal-data-pay-for-it-1524237577 
[https://perma.cc/W8N5-FDN4]. 
 172 See, e.g., Bennett Cyphers & Danny O’Brien, Facing Facebook: Data Portability and Interop-
erability Are Anti-Monopoly Medicine, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 24, 2018), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/07/facing-facebook-data-portability-and-interoperability-are-
anti-monopoly-medicine [https://perma.cc/Z22M-7ZE8] (suggesting that the FTC could impose 
such mandates on Facebook as “part of an antitrust remedy or negotiated settlement”). 
 173 See, e.g., Dani Rodrik & Charles Sabel, Building a Good Jobs Economy 9 (Apr. 2019) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with Harvard Law School Library). 
 174 See Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution 6–7, 33–44 (Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Working Paper No. 679, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3191231 [https://perma.cc/95WW-H4G3] 
(contrasting data “taxes,” id. at 6, with “command-and-control” limits, id. at 33). 
 175 See ANU BRADFORD, THE BRUSSELS EFFECT: HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION RULES 
THE WORLD 143 (forthcoming 2020) (on file with Harvard Law School Library) (discussing the 
GDPR’s broad extraterritorial reach and “the extent to which [global companies] are choosing to 
adopt EU privacy policy as their company standard”); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Bart van der Sloot & 
Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, The European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What 
It Is and What It Means, 28 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 65, 98 (2019) (providing an overview of the 
GDPR and the ways in which it “will influence [privacy] policy worldwide”). 
 176 See Kessler & Pozen, supra note 153, at 1988 nn.164–65 (collecting sources to this effect). 
 177 WU, supra note 138, at 23. 
 178 Rahman, supra note 88, at 1668–80. 
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Amendment as permitting or even requiring the government to take af-
firmative measures “to engineer a fairer, fuller, ‘freer’ expressive envi-
ronment for everyone.”179 
We are not suggesting that these theories are without serious prob-
lems of their own, much less that the Roberts Court is likely to embrace 
any of them.  But neither is the Court likely to embrace Balkin’s ap-
proach.180  And whatever their defects, these other theories at least focus 
attention on the most constitutionally salient feature of companies like 
Google and Facebook: not that their end users must be able to trust and 
depend on them, but that they are extraordinarily powerful actors with 
the potential to do great harm to (as well as good for) the freedoms of 
speech, assembly, and the press.  Put more sharply, a First Amendment 
jurisprudence that analogizes the dominant online firms to doctors and 
lawyers, while ignoring their status as increasingly essential platforms 
for mass communication and the “New Governors” of the public 
sphere,181 is not credible.  It obscures the real social stakes. 
B.  Downside Risks 
Against this highly speculative and very possibly nonexistent First 
Amendment upside, a full analysis of the information-fiduciary proposal 
also needs to consider its potential downsides.  We see several significant 
ones.  As with the critical legal and conceptual points raised in Parts II 
and III, we have not encountered any discussion of these policy risks in 
the growing literature on the subject. 
First, and most simply, a fiduciary framework paints a false portrait 
of the digital world.  It characterizes Facebook, Google, Twitter, and 
other online platforms as fundamentally trustworthy actors who put 
their users’ interests first.  As we tried to show in Part II, this is not a 
plausible depiction of what most of these companies — even if chastened 
in the ways Balkin outlines — are really like.  The tension between what 
it would take to implement a fiduciary duty of loyalty to users, on the 
one hand, and these companies’ economic incentives and duties to share-
holders, on the other, is too deep to resolve without fundamental reform.  
To suggest otherwise is to risk mystification of “surveillance capital-
ism,”182 entrenchment of prevailing business models, and legitimation of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 179 Kessler & Pozen, supra note 153, at 2002. 
 180 See supra notes 161–168 and accompanying text. 
 181 Klonick, supra note 89, at 1663. 
 182 ZUBOFF, supra note 74; cf. Kessler & Pozen, supra note 153, at 1971–73 (reviewing the critical 
literature on “informational capitalism” and “communicative capitalism,” id. at 1972 (first quoting 
Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
369, 371 (2016); and then quoting JODI DEAN, DEMOCRACY AND OTHER NEOLIBERAL 
FANTASIES: COMMUNICATIVE CAPITALISM AND LEFT POLITICS (2009))). 
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a wide range of troubling practices, if not also the unraveling of fiduci-
ary law itself.183 
Second, this false portrait of reality invites policy misfires.  To a large 
extent, it seems that Balkin’s prescriptions would simply mirror or mar-
ginally refine longstanding consumer protection guarantees and anti-
fraud doctrines,184 in which case our time and energy may be better 
spent figuring out how to strengthen enforcement of the existing rules 
rather than proliferating legal categories.185  Meanwhile, to the degree 
that Balkin’s prescriptions depart from existing consumer protection 
law,186 his theory lacks the resources to justify prioritizing those depar-
tures over countless other moves that might be made.  The “grand bar-
gain organized around the idea of fiduciary responsibility” that Balkin 
and Zittrain have put forward,187 in which a new federal statute would 
preempt state laws about online privacy, strikes us as an especially bad 
deal for proponents of online privacy, given the watered-down version 
of fiduciary responsibility such a statute would codify and the “pio-
neer[ing]” role that state attorneys general have played in enforcing their 
own unfair and deceptive trade acts and practices laws.188 
Third, the information-fiduciary proposal conceives of systemic 
problems in relational terms.  The reason a company like Facebook can 
and should be regulated in a special way, it tells us, is that Facebook has 
(or should have) a special relationship of trust and dependency with each 
of its users.  Not only does this argument ignore how Facebook generates 
dependency,189 but it also recasts what ought to be questions of the pub-
lic interest — questions about what kind of social media landscape is 
good for our democracy — in a narrow quasi-contractarian frame that 
asks, instead, what Facebook owes any given individual who signs up 
for its service.  This framing implicitly downgrades other accounts of 
the appropriate bases for government intervention and other models of 
public regulation, in particular those that conceptualize privacy as  
a public good190 or that aim to ward off extreme asymmetries  
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 183 Even if “the law of fiduciary obligation has developed through analogy to contexts in which 
the obligation conventionally applies,” Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of  
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879, presumably some analogies would be so strained 
as to degrade rather than coherently advance this developmental process. 
 184 See supra notes 104–121 and accompanying text. 
 185 For a recent argument that the FTC’s ability to protect consumer privacy has been “severely 
curtailed” by the Commission’s lack of general rulemaking authority, its reluctance to target unfair 
practices as distinct from deceptive practices, and inadequate funding levels, among other factors, 
see Barrett, supra note 20, at 1073–78. 
 186 See supra notes 122–123 and accompanying text. 
 187 Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 5; see supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 188 Citron, supra note 107, at 750, 785, 800, 811. 
 189 See supra section II.C, pp. 516–19. 
 190 On the ways in which digital privacy can be seen as a public good, see generally Joshua A.T. 
Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385 (2015); Zeynep Tufekci, 
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of knowledge and power or “structural stranglehold[s] over digital  
media.”191  By the same token, the information-fiduciary proposal  
implicitly acquiesces in the legal decisions that enabled certain online 
platforms to become so dominant.  It takes current market structures as 
a given. 
Recently, Balkin has suggested that a fiduciary approach to regulat-
ing online platforms can be combined with more ambitious approaches, 
in effect giving us the best of both worlds.192  “The fiduciary approach,” 
Balkin writes, “meshes well with other forms of consumer protection” 
and, “[i]n particular, it does not get in the way of new pro-competition 
rules or increased antitrust enforcement.”193  These policy tools would 
potentially “restructure how digital advertising operates”194 and “break 
up the largest companies into smaller companies that can compete with 
each other or create a space for new competitors to emerge.”195  Balkin’s 
interest in such tools resonates with and responds to a growing body of 
neo-Progressive scholarship that urges greater emphasis on structural 
(or infrastructural) solutions to problems of discrimination and domina-
tion online.196 
While we commend Balkin’s turn toward structural analysis of this 
sort, we are deeply skeptical of the claim that the fiduciary approach 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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“meshes well” with it.  On the contrary, we suspect that the fiduciary 
approach, if pursued with any real vigor, would tend to cannibalize ra-
ther than complement procompetition reforms.  This fourth and final 
downside risk may be the most practically consequential of them all. 
When introducing the information-fiduciary proposal, Balkin and 
Zittrain billed it as a kind of regulatory third way that could transcend 
ordinary political divides and policy tradeoffs.  Highlighting the  
proposal’s “bipartisan appeal,” Zittrain explained that it “protects con-
sumers and corrects a clear market failure without the need for heavy-
handed government intervention.”197  Elsewhere, he suggested that a 
fiduciary approach might “nudge” companies like Facebook to “do the 
right thing,” “without outright requiring it.”198  The details were fuzzy 
but the message was clear.  A fiduciary approach would promote users’ 
interests without necessarily causing too much trouble for the online 
platforms or their business models, thereby allowing Balkin and Zittrain 
to win wide support while sidestepping contentious questions like 
whether to restructure or break up Facebook, a step for which a number 
of commentators have called.199  The basic selling point of the fiduciary 
approach was that it would be flexible, light-touch, un-“heavy-
handed” — in contrast to and in lieu of structural reforms. 
Balkin and Zittrain’s early advocacy traded on an insight that re-
mains as valid today as it was then: lawmakers can regulate the leading 
online platforms as information fiduciaries or target their market domi-
nance and business models, but lawmakers very likely will not do both.  
To assume otherwise is to overlook the opportunity costs, path depend-
encies, and expressive effects inherent in creating a new fiduciary re-
gime.  Mark Zuckerberg seems to grasp this.  He is presumably attracted 
to the information-fiduciary proposal not just because of its “thought-
ful[ness]”200 and “intuitive[ness]”201 but also because of its political im-
plications.  An entity that is designated by the government as a loyal 
caretaker for the personal data of millions of Americans is not an entity 
that is liable to be dismantled by that same government.  Facebook-as-
fiduciary is no longer a public problem to be solved, potentially through 
radical reform.  It is a nexus of sensitive private relationships to be man-
aged, nurtured, and sustained. 
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V.  ALTERNATIVE ANALOGIES 
This Article is an exercise in critique, not prescription.  We have 
interrogated the increasingly popular analogy between online platforms 
and their end users, on the one hand, and professional fiduciaries and 
their patients and clients, on the other, and we have found this analogy 
inapposite on multiple levels.  Analogical reasoning can retard rather 
than advance the cause of legal reform when it elides important institu-
tional differences or normative considerations.202  Although we do not 
elaborate any reform program of our own in this Article, we will close by 
noting two analogies that strike us as more felicitous starting points than 
traditional fiduciary relationships for the project of platform regulation. 
First, in the case of Facebook, Google, and other large online plat-
forms, we might draw an analogy to “offline” providers of social and 
economic infrastructure.203  To the degree that these platforms serve as 
key channels of communication, commerce, and information flow, they 
can be recognized as controlling the terms of access to essential services.  
In the Progressive Era, policymakers feared that concentrated private 
control over infrastructure would create an intolerable imbalance of 
power between a small number of firms and the communities, busi-
nesses, and individuals dependent on them.204  Regulatory interventions 
were therefore focused on directly disciplining this power through a 
combination of legal tools, including nondiscrimination and common 
carrier regimes, limits on the lines of business in which firms could en-
gage, interoperability requirements, corporate governance reforms, and 
public options.205 
The same regulatory principles deserve close consideration today.  To 
the extent that Facebook and Google have achieved their dominance 
through anticompetitive means, antitrust lawsuits reversing key acqui-
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sitions and penalizing forms of monopoly leveraging might play a com-
plementary role by opening up both primary and adjacent markets.206  
Importantly, however, “structural” interventions do not necessarily have 
to break up firms.  They can also reshape business incentives through 
bright-line prohibitions on specific modes of earning revenue, and they 
can reshape markets by creating the conditions for greater competition 
and consumer autonomy.207  Data interoperability requirements, for ex-
ample, allow users to move their data across platforms, which in turn 
requires incumbent services to continuously compete.208  With such re-
quirements in place, a platform that perennially violated users’ privacy 
would likely lose ground to more privacy-conscious rivals, instead of 
benefiting from high switching costs that keep users trapped within un-
healthy environments.209 
Second, in thinking about the regulatory challenges posed by digital 
platforms’ collection, aggregation, and use of personal data, we might 
draw an analogy to environmental pollution.  Professor Omri Ben- 
Shahar has recently proposed this analogy as a way to move beyond the 
privacy paradigm in addressing the social harms of these practices — 
not just the concerns they may raise for any given individual subject to 
surveillance but also the negative externalities they may cause for third 
parties and for public interests more generally.210  A pollution perspec-
tive helps to highlight why private law solutions are inadequate to the 
nature of the threat.211 
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The pollution analogy points away from individualistic, consumer-
centric frameworks and toward a different set of techniques for reducing 
surveillance-related harms: namely, ex ante prohibitions on which sorts 
of data can be gathered and to what extent; Pigouvian taxes on data 
collection and retention that force firms to internalize their social costs; 
and ex post liability rules for data “spills” and other data disasters that 
facilitate deterrence and compensation.212  We take no stance here as to 
the optimal design of or balance among these techniques.  We do, how-
ever, endorse the implicit insight that the harms from digital surveillance 
must be met with clear prohibitions and economic disincentives, rather 
than morally laden standards. 
A fiduciary approach that targets “con artist[ry]”213 invites the dom-
inant platforms to shun a small set of behaviors and then claim the 
mantle of trustworthiness, both narrowing the scope of public debate 
and normalizing the basic operations of surveillance capitalism.214  
Without inviting these responses, outright limits or harsh penalties on 
certain forms of data collection and retention could help to detoxify the 
larger online ecosystem while preventing platforms from conditioning 
access to essential services on the ever-greater surrendering of personal 
data.  The German competition authority recently provided an example 
of such an approach when it ruled that “Facebook will no longer  
be allowed to force its users to agree to the practically unrestricted col-
lection and assigning of non-Facebook data [culled from third- 
party sources] to their Facebook user accounts.”215  The upshot, the  
Bundeskartellamt’s president said, will be a “divestiture” of data216 — or, 
in other words, less power for Facebook and less pollution for everyone. 
CONCLUSION 
Figuring out how to regulate digital firms such as Facebook, Google, 
and Twitter is one of the central challenges of the “Second Gilded 
Age,”217 and Balkin deserves credit for moving the conversation for-
ward.  His information-fiduciary proposal, however, is also moving the 
conversation backward — redirecting attention away from all of the 
problems associated with high levels of market concentration, away 
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from all of the problems plaguing the speech environment on social me-
dia, away from all of the problems inherent in targeted-advertising-
based business models.  We do not claim to know what precise mix of 
regulatory strategies is best, and the answer will likely vary across mar-
kets.  But for the reasons detailed above, we believe that structural re-
forms should assume a more prominent place in the debate.  By contrast, 
we doubt that the information-fiduciary idea should play any significant 
role in the struggle to rein in the leading online platforms and reclaim 
the online public sphere.  If this Article’s main arguments have been 
persuasive, the burden is on supporters of the information-fiduciary idea 
to clarify how it can be reconciled with the relevant firms’ economic 
incentives and with the facts of digital life, what it adds to existing the-
ories and practices of consumer protection, and why anyone other than 
the dominant platform owners should see it as a promising path forward. 
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